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Abstract
We describe scalable protocols for solving the secure multi-party computation (MPC) problem
among a large number of parties. We consider both the synchronous and the asynchronous
communication models. In the synchronous setting, our protocol is secure against a static
malicious adversary corrupting less than a 1/3 fraction of the parties. In the asynchronous
setting, we allow the adversary to corrupt less than a 1/8 fraction of parties. For any deterministic
function that can be computed by an arithmetic circuit with m gates, both of our protocols
require each party to send a number of field elements and perform an amount of computation that
is O˜(m/n+
√
n). We also show that our protocols provide perfect and universally-composable
security.
To achieve our asynchronous MPC result, we define the threshold counting problem and
present a distributed protocol to solve it in the asynchronous setting. This protocol is load
balanced, with computation, communication and latency complexity of O(log n), and can also be
used for designing other load-balanced applications in the asynchronous communication model.
1 Introduction
In secure multi-party computation (MPC), a set of parties, each having a secret value, want to
compute a common function over their inputs, without revealing any information about their inputs
other than what is revealed by the output of the function. Recent years have seen a renaissance
in MPC, but unfortunately, the distributed computing community is in danger of missing out. In
particular, while new MPC algorithms boast dramatic improvements in latency and communication
costs, none of these algorithms offer significant improvements in the highly distributed case, where
the number of parties is large.
∗This is the extended version of the paper published in the proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on
Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN 2014). This research was partially supported by NSF CAREER
Award 0644058 and NSF grants CCR-0313160 and CCF-1320994.
†varsha@cs.unm.edu
‡val@uvic.ca
§movahedi@cs.unm.edu
¶saia@cs.unm.edu
‖zamani@cs.unm.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
20
3.
02
89
v3
  [
cs
.D
S]
  2
8 S
ep
 20
15
This is unfortunate, since MPC holds the promise of addressing many important problems
in distributed computing. How can peers in BitTorrent auction off resources without hiring an
auctioneer? How can we design a decentralized Twitter that enables provably anonymous broadcast
of messages. How can we create deep learning algorithms over data spread among large clusters of
machines?
Most large-scale distributed systems are composed of nodes with limited resources. This makes it
of extreme importance to balance the protocol load across all parties involved. Also, large networks
tend to have weak admission control mechanisms which makes them likely to contain malicious
nodes. Thus, a key variant of the MPC problem that we consider will be when a certain hidden
fraction of the nodes are controlled by a malicious adversary.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we describe general MPC protocols for computing arithmetic circuits. In terms of
communication and computation costs per party, our protocols scale sublinearly with the number of
parties and linearly with the size of the circuit.
To achieve sublinear communication and computation costs, our protocols critically rely on the
notion of quorums. A quorum is a set of O(log n) parties, where the number of corrupted parties in
each quorum is guaranteed not to exceed a certain fraction. We describe an efficient protocol for
creating a sufficient number of quorums in the asynchronous setting.
To adapt to the asynchronous setting, we introduce the general problem of threshold counting.
We show how this problem relates to the problem of dealing with arbitrarily-delayed inputs in our
asynchronous MPC protocol, and then propose an efficient protocol for solving it.
When a protocol is concurrently executed alongside other protocols (or with other instances of
the same protocol), one must ensure this composition preserves the security of the protocol. We
show that our protocols are secure under such concurrent compositions by proving its security in
the universal composability (UC) framework of Canetti [Can01].
1.2 Model
Consider n parties P1, ..., Pn in a fully-connected network with private and authenticated channels.
In our asynchronous protocol, we assume communication is via asynchronous message passing, so
that sent messages may be arbitrarily and adversarially delayed. Latency (or running time) of a
protocol in this model is defined as the maximum length of any chain of messages sent/received
throughout the protocol (see [CD89, AW04]).
We assume a malicious adversary who controls an unknown subset of parties. We refer to these
parties as corrupted and to the remaining as honest. The honest parties always follow our protocol,
but the corrupted parties not only may share information with other corrupted parties but also can
deviate from the protocol in any arbitrary manner, e.g., by sending invalid messages or remaining
silent.
We assume the adversary is static meaning that it must select the set of corrupted parties at
the start of the protocol. We assume that the adversary is computationally-unbounded; thus, we
make no cryptographic hardness assumptions.
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1.3 Problem Statement
Multi-Party Computation. In the MPC problem, n parties, each holding a private input, want
to jointly evaluate a deterministic n-ary function f over their inputs while ensuring:
1. Each party learns the correct output of f ; and
2. No party learns any information about other parties’ inputs other than what is revealed from
the output.
Constraints for the Asynchronous Model. Consider a simple setting, where, the n parties
send their inputs to a trusted party P who then locally computes f and sends the result back to
every party. In the asynchronous setting, the MPC problem is challenging even with such a trusted
party. In particular, since the t corrupted parties can refrain from sending their inputs to P , it can
only wait for n− t inputs rather than n inputs. Then, it can compute f over n inputs consisting of
n− t values received from the parties and t dummy (default) values for the missing inputs. Finally,
the trusted party sends the output back to the parties. The goal of asynchronous MPC is to achieve
the same functionality as the above scenario but without the trusted party P .
discuss the termination condition based FLP impossibility. In this paper, we show that protocol
terminates with high probability.
Quorum Building. A quorum is a set of Θ(log n) parties, where the fraction of corrupted parties
in this set is at most t/n+  for a small positive constant . In the quorum building problem, there
are n parties up to t < n of whom may be corrupted. The goal is to ensure all parties agree on a
set of n quorums such that each party is mapped to O(log n) quorums.
Threshold Counting. In this problem, there are n honest parties each with a flag bit initially set
to 0. At least τ < n of the parties will eventually set their bits to 1. The goal is for all the parties
to learn when the number of bits set to 1 becomes greater than or equal to τ .
1.4 Our Results
The main results of this paper are summarized by the following theorems proved in Section 5. We
consider an n-ary function, f , represented as an arithmetic circuit of depth d with m gates.
Theorem 1. There exist a universally-composable protocol that with high probability solves the
synchronous MPC problem and has the following properties:
• It is secure against t < (1/3− )n corrupted parties, for some fixed  > 0.
• Each party sends O˜(m/n+√n) field elements.
• Each party performs O˜(m/n+√n) computations.
• The expected running time is O(dpolylog(n)).
Theorem 2. There exist a universally-composable protocol that with high probability solves the
asynchronous MPC problem and has the following properties:
• It is secure against t < (1/8− )n corrupted parties, for some fixed  > 0.
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• Each party sends O˜(m/n+√n) field elements.
• Each party performs O˜(m/n+√n) computations.
• The expected running time is O(dpolylog(n)).
Paper Organization. In Section 2, we discuss related work. In Section 3, we define our notation
and discuss the building blocks used in our protocols. We present our MPC protocols in Section 4.
In Section 5, we prove the security of our MPC protocols. Section 6 is a self-contained presentation
of the threshold counting problem and our solution to this problem. In Section 7, we describe an
asynchronous protocol for the quorum building problem. Finally, we conclude in Section 8 and
discuss future directions.
2 Related Work
Due to the large body of work, we do not attempt a comprehensive review of the MPC literature
here, but rather focus on seminal work and, in particular, schemes that achieve sublinear per-party
communication costs. The MPC problem was first described by Yao [Yao82]. He described an
algorithm for MPC with two parties in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. Goldreich et
al. [GMW87] propose the first MPC protocol that is secure against a malicious adversary. This
work along with [CDG88, GHY88] are all based on cryptographic hardness assumptions. These
were later followed by several cryptographic improvements [BMR90, GRR98, CFGN96].
In a seminal work, Ben-Or et al. [BGW88] show that every function can be computed with
information-theoretic security in the presence of a semi-honest adversary controlling less than half of
the parties, and in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling less than a third of the parties.
They describe a protocol for securely evaluating an arithmetic circuit that represents the function.
This work was later improved in terms of both communication and computation costs in
[CCD88, Bea91, GRR98]. Unfortunately, these methods all have poor communication scalability.
In particular, if there are n parties involved in the computation, and the function f is represented
by a circuit with m gates, then these algorithms require each party to send a number of messages
and perform a number of computations that is Ω(nm).
These were followed by several improvements to the cost of MPC, when m (i.e., the circuit size)
is much larger than n [DI06, DN07, DIK+08]. For example, the protocol of Damg˚ard et al. [DIK+08]
incurs computation and communication costs that are O˜(m) plus a polynomial in n. Unfortunately,
the additive polynomial in these algorithms is large (at least Ω(n6)) making them impractical for
large n. One may argue that for large circuits the circuit-dependent complexity dominates the
polynomial complexity. However, we believe there are many useful circuits such as the ones used
in [?, HKI+12] which have relatively small number of gates.
Asynchronous MPC. Foundational work in asynchronous MPC was presented by Ben-Or et
al. [BCG93]. They adapt the protocol of [BGW88] to the asynchronous setting and show that
asynchronous MPC is possible for up to n/3 fail-stop faults and up to n/4 malicious faults.
Improvements were made by Srinathan and Rangan [SR00] and Prabhu et al. [PSR02] with a final
communication cost of O(n3) per multiplication achieved by Beerliova´-Trub´ıniova´ and Hirt [BTH07]
for perfectly-secure asynchronous MPC with the optimal resiliency bound of up to n/4.
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Damg˚ard et al. [DGKN09] describe a perfectly-secure MPC that guarantees termination only
when the adversary allows a preprocessing phase to terminate. However, their protocol is not fully
asynchronous, as they assume a few synchronization points; hence, they can achieve a resiliency
bound of up to n/3.
Choudhury et al. [CHP13] propose an amortized asynchronous MPC protocols with linear
communication complexity per multiplication gate meaning that the communication done by
an individual party for each gate does not grow with the number of parties. This protocol is
unconditionally-secure against up to n/4 corrupted parties with a small failure probability. In our
paper, we are directly addressing the third open problem of [CHP13] as we quote here:
“If one is willing to reduce the resilience t from the optimal resilience by a constant fraction, then
by using additional techniques like packed secret sharing, committee election and quorum forming,
one can achieve additional efficiency in the synchronous MPC protocols, as shown in [...]. It would
be interesting to see whether such techniques can be used in the asynchronous settings to gain
additional improvements.”
MPC with Sublinear Overhead. We first introduced the notion of using quorums to decrease
message cost in MPC in a brief announcement [DKMS12]. In that paper, we described a synchronous
protocol with bit complexity of O˜(m/n +
√
n) per party that can tolerate a computationally
unbounded adversary who controls up to (1/3− ) fraction of the parties for any fixed positive .
As network size scales, it becomes infeasible to require each party to communicate with all other
parties.
The current paper is the detailed version of our later extended abstract [DKMS14], where
we described algorithms to improve [DKMS12] by handling asynchronous communication. One
important challenge in the asynchronous communication model is to ensure that at least n− t inputs
are committed to, before the circuit evaluation. To address this issue we introduce and solve the
threshold counting problem.
Boyle et al. [BGT13] describe a synchronous MPC protocol for evaluating arithmetic circuits.
The protocol is computationally-secure against an adversary corrupting up to (1/3− ) fraction of
parties, for some fixed positive . Similar to [DKMS12], the protocol of [BGT13] also uses quorums
to achieve sublinear per-party communication cost. Interestingly, the communication cost of this
protocol is independent of circuit size. This is achieved by evaluating the circuit over encrypted
values using a fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [Gen09]. Unfortunately, the protocol
is not fully load-balanced as it evaluates the circuit using only one quorum (called the supreme
committee). The protocol requires each party to send polylog(n) messages of size O˜(n) bits and
requires polylog(n) rounds.
Chandran et al. [CCG+14] address two limitations of the protocol of [BGT13]: tolerating
an adaptive adversary and achieving optimal resiliency (i.e., t < n/2 malicious parties). They
replace the common reference string assumption of [BGT13] with a different setup assumption
called symmetric-key infrastructure, where every pair of parties share a uniformly-random key
that is unknown to other parties. The authors also show how to remove the SKI assumption at
a cost of increasing the communication locality by O(
√
n). Although this protocol provides small
communication locality, the bandwidth cost seems to be super-polynomial due to large message
sizes.
Boyle et al. [BCP14] describe a scalable technique for secure computation of RAM pro-
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Table 1: Recent MPC results with sublinear communication costs
Protocol Security
Resiliency
Bound
Async?
Assumes
Broad-
cast
Chan-
nel?
Total
Message
Complexity
Total
Computation
Complexity
Latency Msg Size
Load-
Balanced?
[BGT13] Crypto (1/3− )n No No O˜(n) Ω˜(n) +
Ω˜(κmd3)† O˜(1)
O(n` ·
polylog(n))
No
[BCP14] Perfect (1/3− )n No Yes poly(n) +
O˜
(
Time(Π)
) poly(n) +
O˜
(
T ime(Π)
) O˜(T ime(Π)) O(`) Yes
[CCG+14] Crypto‡ n/2 No No
O(n log1+ n)
or
O(n
√
n log1+ n)
Ω(n log1+ n)
or
Ω(n
√
n log1+ n)
O(log
′
n)
Ω
(
loglogn n
)
or
Ω
(√
n
logn) Yes
This
paper
(sync)
Perfect (1/3− )n No No O˜(m+ n√n) O˜(m+ n√n) O(d+
polylog(n)
) O(`) Yes
This
paper
(async)
Perfect (1/8− )n Yes No O˜(m+ n√n) O˜(m+ n√n) O(d+
polylog(n)
) O(`) Yes
Parameters: n is the number of parties; ` is the size of a field element; d is the depth of the circuit; κ is the the
security parameter; , ′ are the positive constants; T ime(Π) is the worst-case running time of RAM program Π.
Notes:
†The cost is calculated based on the FHE scheme of [BGV12].
‡Assumes a symmetric-key infrastructure. However, unlike the rest, this protocol is secure against an adaptive
adversary.
grams [GO96] in large networks by performing local communications in quorums of parties. For
securely evaluating a RAM program Π, their protocol incurs a total communication and computation
of poly(n) + O˜(Time(Π)) while requiring O˜(|x|+ Space(Π)/n) memory per party, where Time(Π)
and Space(Π) are time and space complexity of Π respectively, and |x| denotes the input size.
In Table 1, we review recent MPC results that provide sublinear communication locality. All
of these results rely on some quorum building technique for creating a set of quorums each with
honest majority.
Counting Networks. The threshold counting problem can be solved in a load-balanced way using
counting networks that were first introduced by Aspnes et al. [AHS91]. Counting networks are
constructed from simple two-input two-output computing elements called balancers connected to
one another by wires. A counting network can count any number of inputs even if they arrive at
arbitrary times, are distributed unevenly among the input wires, and propagate through the network
asynchronously.
Aspnes et al. [AHS91] establish an O(log2 n) upper bound on the depth complexity of counting
networks. Since the latency of counting is dependent on the depth of the network, minimizing
this depth has been the goal of many papers in this area. A simple explicit construction of an
O(clog
∗ n log n)-depth counting network (for some positive constant c), and a randomized construction
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of an O(log n)-depth counting network that works with high probability are described by Klugerman
and Plaxton in [KP92, Klu95]. These constructions use the AKS sorting network [AKS83] as a
building block. While this sorting network and the resulting counting networks have O(log n) depth
and require each party (or gate in their setting) to send O(log n) messages, large hidden constants
render them impractical.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we define standard terms, notation, and known building blocks used throughout this
paper.
Notation. We denote the set of integers {1, ..., n} by [n]. We say an event occurs with high
probability, if it occurs with probability at least 1− 1/nc, for some c > 0 and sufficiently large n. A
protocol is called t-private if no coalition of t corrupted parties can learn anything more than what
is implied by their private inputs and the protocol output. A protocol is called t-resilient if no set
of t or less parties can influence the correctness of the outputs of the remaining parties.
We also assume that all arithmetic operations in the circuit are carried out over a finite field F.
The size of F depends on the specific function to be computed and is always Ω(log n). All of the
messages transmitted by our protocol are logarithmic in F and n.
Let r be a value chosen uniformly at random from F and x̂ = x+ r, for any x ∈ F. In this case,
we say x is masked with r and we refer to r and x̂ as the mask and the masked value respectively.
Universal Composability Framework. When a protocol is executed several times possibly
concurrently with other protocols, one requires to ensure this composition preserves the security of
the protocol. This is because an adversary attacking several protocols that run concurrently can
cause more harm than by attacking a stand-alone execution, where only a single instance of one of
the protocols is executed.
One way to ensure this is to show the security of the protocol in the universal composability (UC)
framework of Canetti [Can01]. A protocol that is secure in the UC framework is called UC-secure.
We describe this framework in Section 5.
Verifiable Secret Sharing. An (n, t)-secret sharing scheme is a protocol in which a dealer who
holds a secret value shares it among n parties such that any set of t < n parties cannot gain
any information about the secret, but any set of at least t + 1 parties can reconstruct it. An
(n, t)-verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme is an (n, t)-secret sharing scheme with the additional
property that after the sharing stage, a dishonest dealer is either disqualified or the honest parties
can reconstruct the secret, even if shares sent by dishonest parties are spurious. When we say a set
of shares of a secret are valid, we mean the secret can be uniquely reconstructed solely from the set
of shares distributed among the parties.
In this paper, we use the (dn/3e − 1)-resilient VSS scheme of Ben-Or et al. [BGW88] for the
synchronous setting and the (dn/4e − 1)-resilient VSS scheme of Ben-Or et al. [BCG93] for the
asynchronous setting. When run among n parties, both protocols incur poly(n) communication cost
and O(1) latency. We refer to the sharing stages of these protocols as VSS-Share and AVSS-Share,
and to their reconstruction stages as VSS-Reconst and AVSS-Reconst, respectively.
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Classic MPC. Our main protocols rely on the classic (dn/3e − 1)-resilient MPC protocol of Ben-
Or et al. [BGW88] for the synchronous setting and the classic (dn/4e − 1)-resilient MPC protocol
of Ben-Or et al. [BCG93] for the asynchronous setting. When run among n parties to compute a
circuit with d gates, both protocols send poly(n) bits and incur a latency of O(d). We refer to the
former protocol as CMPC and to the latter as ACMPC.
In this paper, we use the above VSS and classic MPC protocols only among logarithmic-size
groups of parties and only for computing logarithmic-size circuits. Thus, the communication
overhead per invocation of these protocols will be polylog(n).
Byzantine Agreement. In the Byzantine agreement problem, each party is initially given an
input bit. All honest parties must agree on a bit which coincides with at least one of their input
bits.
When parties only have access to secure pairwise channels, a protocol is required to ensure secure
(reliable) broadcast. This guarantees all parties receive the same message even if the broadcaster
(dealer) is dishonest and sends different messages to different parties. Every time a broadcast is
required in our protocols, we use the Byzantine agreement algorithms of Feldman and Micali [FM88].
We refer to their (dn/3e− 1)-resilient synchronous algorithm as BA and to their (dn/4e− 1)-resilient
asynchronous algorithm as ABA. When all parties participating in a run of a broadcast protocol
receive the same message, we say these messages are consistent.
4 Our Protocols
We now describe our protocols for scalable MPC in large networks. Throughout this section, we
consider the network model defined in Section 1.2. We first describe our synchronous protocol, and
then adapt this protocol to the asynchronous setting.
We assume that the parties have an arithmetic circuit C computing f ; the circuit consists of
m addition and multiplication gates. For convenience of presentation, we assume each gate has
in-degree and out-degree 2.1 For any two gates x and y in C, if the output of x is input to y, we
say that x is a child of y and that y is a parent of x. We assume the gates of C are numbered
1, 2, . . . ,m, where the gate numbered 1 is the output (root) gate.
4.1 Synchronous MPC
The high-level idea behind our protocols is to first create a sufficient number of quorums and assign
to each gate in the circuit one of these quorums. Then, for each party Pi holding an input xi ∈ F,
Pi secret-shares xi among all parties in the quorum associated with the i-th input gate. We refer to
such a quorum as an input quorum.
Next, the protocol evaluates the circuit gate-by-gate starting from input gates. Each gate is
jointly evaluated by parties of the quorum associated with this gate over the secret-shared inputs
provided by its children. In a similar way, the result of the gate is then used as the input to the
computation of the parent gate. Finally, the quorum associated with the root gate, constructs the
final result and sends it to all parties via a binary tree of quorums.
This high-level idea relies on solutions to the following main problems.
1Our protocol works, with minor modifications, for gates with arbitrary constant fan-in and fan-out.
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Quorum Building. Creating a sufficient number of quorums. In Section 7, we describe a random-
ized protocol called Build-Quorums that achieves this goal with high probability.
Circuit Evaluation. Securely evaluating each gate over secret-shared inputs by the parties inside
a quorum. In Section 4.1.2, we describe a protocol called Circuit-Eval that achieves this goal.
Share Renewal. Sending the result of one quorum to another without revealing any information
to any individual party or to any coalition of corrupted parties in both quorums. We solve this as
part of our gate evaluation protocol described in Section 4.1.2.
Protocol 1 is our main protocol. When we say a party VSS-shares (or secret-shares) a value s
in a quorum Q (or among a set of parties), we mean the party participates as the dealer with input
s in the protocol VSS-Share with all parties in Q (or in the set of parties).
Protocol 1 Synchronous MPC
1. Quorum Building. All parties run Build-Quorums to agree on n good quorums Q1, ..., Qn.
The i-th gate of C is assigned to Q(i mod n), for all i ∈ [m].
2. Input Commitment. For all i ∈ [n], party Pi holding an input value xi ∈ F runs the
following steps concurrently:
(a) Pick a uniformly random element ri ∈ F, set x̂ = xi + ri, and broadcast x̂ to Qi.
(b) Run VSS-Share to secret-share ri in Qi.
3. Circuit Evaluation. All parties participate in a run of Circuit-Eval to securely evaluate C.
4. Output Reconstruction. For the output gate z, parties in Qz,
(a) Run VSS-Reconst to reconstruct rz from its shares.
(b) Set the circuit output message: y ← ŷz − rz.
(c) Send y to all parties in the Q2 and Q3.
5. Output Propagation. For every i ∈ {2, ..., n}, parties in Qi perform the following steps:
(a) Receive y from the Qbi/2c.
(b) Send y to all parties in Q2i and Q2i+1.
The protocol starts by running Build-Quorums to create n quorums Q1, ..., Qn. Then, it assigns
the gates of C to these quorums in the following way. The output gate of C is assigned to Q1; then,
every gate in C numbered i (other than the output gate) is assigned to Q(i mod n). For each gate
u ∈ C, we let Qu denote the quorum associated with u, yu denote the output of u, ru be a random
element from F, and ŷv denote the masked output of u, where ŷu = yu + ru.
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CMPC
Qv
CMPC
Qu
QwQv
CMPC
Qw
Same quorumsSame quorums
Figure 1: The gate gadgets for gate u and its left and right children
4.1.1 Input Commitment
Let Qi be the quorum associated with party Pi who holds input xi. At the start of our protocol, Pi
samples a value ri uniformly at random from F, sets x̂ = xi + ri, and broadcasts x̂ to all parties in
Qi. Next, Pi runs VSS-Share to secret-share ri among all parties in Qi.
4.1.2 Circuit Evaluation
The main idea for reducing the amount of communication required in evaluating the circuit is
quorum-based gate evaluation. If each party participates in the computation of the whole circuit, it
must communicate with all other parties. Instead, in quorum-based gate evaluation, each gate of the
circuit is computed by a gate gadget. A gate gadget (see Figure 1) consists of three quorums: two
input quorums and one output quorum. Input quorums are associated with the gate’s children which
serve inputs to the gate. The output quorum is associated with the gate itself and is responsible
for creating a shared random mask and maintaining the output of the quorum for later use in the
circuit. As depicted in Figure 1, these gate gadgets connect to form the entire circuit. In particular,
for any gate u, the output quorum of u’s gate gadget is the input quorum of the gate gadget for all
of u’s parents.
The parties in each gate gadget run CMPC among themselves to compute the gate operation.
To ensure privacy is preserved, each gate gadget maintains the invariant that the value computed by
the gadget is the value that the corresponding gate in the original circuit would compute, masked by
a uniformly random element of the field. This random element is not known to any individual party.
Instead, shares of it are held by the members of the output quorum. Thus, the output quorum can
participate as an input quorum for the evaluation of any parent gate and provide both the masked
version of the inputs and shares of the mask. The gate gadget computation is performed in the
same way for all gates in the circuit until the final output of the whole circuit is computed. After
the input commitment step, for each input gate u, parties in Qu know the masked input ŷu, and
each has a share of the mask ru.
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(a) (b) (c)
CMPC
Qu
Qv Qw
Shares of  ru
CMPC
Qu
Qv Qw
Shares of ru
Qv Qw
Shares of  ru
yv + rv
Shares of  rv
yw + rw
Shares of  rw
yu + ru
Qu
Figure 2: Evaluation of gate u: (a) generating ru, (b) providing inputs to CMPC, (c) receiving the
masked outputs
The first step of the circuit evaluation is to generate shares of uniformly random field elements
for all gates. If a party is in a quorum at gate u, it generates shares of ru, a uniformly random
field element, by participating in the Gen-Rand protocol. These shares are needed as inputs to the
subsequent run of CMPC.
Protocol 2 Circuit-Eval
Goal. Given a circuit C, the protocol securely evaluates C.
For every gate u ∈ C with children v, w ∈ C, parties in Qu, Qv, and Qw perform the following steps
to compute the gate functionality:
1. Mask Generation. Parties in Qu run Gen-Rand to jointly generate a secret-shared random
value ru ∈ F.
2. MPC in Quorums. The following parties participate in a run of CMPC with their corre-
sponding inputs:
• Every party in Qu with his share of ru.
• Every party in Qv with his input
(ŷv, his share of rv).
• Every party in Qw with his input
(ŷw, his share of rw).
Next, parties form the gadget for each gate u to evaluate the functionality of the gate using Circuit-
Eval. Let v and w be the left and right children of u respectively. The gate evaluation process is
shown in Figure 2. The values yv and yw are the inputs to u, and yu is the its output as it would be
computed by a trusted party. Each party in Qu has a share of the random element ru via Gen-Rand.
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Every party in Qv has the masked value yv + rv and a share of rv (respectively for Qw).
As shown in Part (b) of Figure 2, all parties in the three quorums participate in a run of CMPC,
using their inputs, in order to compute ŷu = yu + ru. Part (c) of the figure shows the output of the
gate evaluation after participating in CMPC. Each party in Qu now learns ŷu as well a share of ru.
Therefore, parties in Qu now have the input required for performing the computation of parents of
u (if any). Note that both yu and ru remain unknown to any individual.
The gate evaluation is performed for all gates in C starting from the bottom to the top. The
output of the quorum associated with the output gate in C is the output of the entire algorithm.
This quorum will unmask the output via the output reconstruction step. The last step of the
algorithm is to send this output to all parties. We do this via a complete binary tree of quorums,
rooted at the output quorum.
Protocol 3 Gen-Rand
Goal. A set of parties P1, ..., PN in a quorum want to agree on a secret-shared value r chosen
uniformly at random from F.
1. For all i ∈ [N ], party Pi chooses ρi ∈ F uniformly at random and VSS-shares it among all N
parties.
2. For every j ∈ [N ], let N ′ be the number of shares Pj receives from the previous step, and
ρ1j , ..., ρN ′j be these shares. Pj computes rj =
∑N ′
k=1 ρkj .
4.1.3 Implementing the Gate Circuit
For every gate u ∈ C, the Circuit-Eval protocol requires a circuit (as we denote by Cu) for unmasking
the masked inputs ŷv and ŷw, computing u’s functionality fu over the unmasked inputs, and masking
the output with the gate’s random value ru. This circuit is securely evaluated using the CMPC
protocol by the quorum associated with u.
For unmasking an input, Cu requires a reconstruction circuit, which given a set of shares, outputs
the corresponding secret. Since dishonest parties may send spurious shares, the circuit implements
the error-correcting algorithm of Berlekamp and Welch [BW86] to fix such corruptions. Then,
the resulting shares are given to an interpolation circuit which implements a simple polynomial
interpolation. Figure 3 depicts the circuit for gate u.
We now briefly describe the error correcting algorithm of Berlekamp and Welch [BW86]. Let
Fp denote a finite field of prime order p, and S = {(x1, y1) | xi, yi ∈ Fp}ηi=1 be a set of η points,
where η − ε of them are on a polynomial y = P (x) of degree τ , and the rest ε < (η − τ + 1)/2
points are erroneous. Given the set of points S, the goal is to find the polynomial P (x). The
algorithm proceeds as follows. Consider two polynomials E(x) = e0 + e1x+ ...+ eεx
ε of degree ε,
and Q(x) = q0 + q1x+ ...+ qkx
k of degree k ≤ ε+ τ − 1 such that yiE(xi) = Q(xi) for all i ∈ [η].
This defines a system of η linear equations with ε+ k = η variables e0, ..., eε, q0, ..., qk that can be
solved efficiently using Gaussian elimination technique to get the coefficients of E(x) and Q(x).
Finally, calculate P (x) = Q(x)/E(x).
Since the Gaussian elimination algorithm over finite fields has O(n3) arithmetic complexity [?],
the corresponding circuit has at most O(n3) levels. Since the interpolation circuit consists of at
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Figure 3: Circuit of gate u
most O(n2) arithmetic operations (using the Lagrange’s method [?]), the overall depth of the
reconstruction circuit will be O(n3).
4.2 Asynchronous MPC
We now adapt our synchronous protocol to the asynchronous communication model. We do this by
modifying the following parts of Protocol 1:
1. We replace the synchronous subprotocols VSS-Share, VSS-Reconst, and CMPC with their
corresponding asynchronous versions AVSS-Share, AVSS-Reconst, and ACMPC, respectively.
In Section 7, we describe a technique for adapting Build-Quorums to the asynchronous setting.
2. At the end of the Input Commitment stage, the protocol should wait for at least n− t inputs
before proceeding to the Circuit Evaluation stage. To this end, we introduce a new subprotocol
called Wait-For-Inputs and invoke it right after step (b) of the Input Commitment stage. This
protocol is described in Section 4.2.1.
3. Although the protocol ACMPC terminates with probability one, its actual running time (i.e.,
the number of rounds until it terminates) is a random variable with expected value O(D logN),
where N is the number of parties participating in the MPC and D is the circuit depth [BCG93].
Since we run m instances of ACMPC (one for each gate of C), we need a method that allows us
to bound the running time of each gate, and thus to bound the expected running time of our
asynchronous MPC protocol. We describe a simple method for achieving this in Section 4.2.2.
4. In the second step of Gen-Rand (Protocol 3), each party may receive less than N shares. This
is because
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4.2.1 Implementing Wait-For-Inputs
The protocol Wait-For-Inputs counts the number of inputs that are successfully received by their
corresponding input quorums. This can be achieved using a solution to the threshold counting
problem: Count the number of inputs successfully received by each input quorum and return once
this number becomes greater than or equal to n− t. As a result of returning from Wait-For-Inputs,
the main protocol resumes and starts the circuit evaluation procedure.
In Section 6, we provide a solution to the threshold counting problem. We refer to this protocol
as Thresh-Count. This protocol creates a distributed tree structure called the count tree which is
known to all parties and determines how the parties communicate with each other to count of the
number of inputs.
Protocol 4 implements Wait-For-Inputs using our Thresh-Count algorithm. In Wait-For-Inputs,
the role of each party in Thresh-Count (i.e., each node in the count tree) is played by a quorum of
parties. Once Thresh-Count terminates, the parties in each input quorum decide whether or not the
corresponding inputs are part of the computation.
When run among quorums, Thresh-Count requires the quorums to communicate with each other.
We say a quorum Q sends a message M to quorum Q′, when every (honest) party in Q sends M to
every party in Q′. A party in Q′ is said to have received M from Q if it receives M from at least
7/8 of the parties in Q. When we say a party broadcasts a message M to a quorum Q, we mean the
party sends M to every party in Q, and then, all parties in Q run BA over their messages to ensure
they all hold the same message.
Protocol 4 Wait-For-Inputs
Goal. For every input quorum Q, all parties in a quorum Q wait until n− t inputs are received by
the input quorums. For each party Pi ∈ Q, Pi is initially holding two values x̂ and ri, the i-th share
of a random value r.
Each party Pi ∈ Q does the following:
1. Run Thresh-Count with flag bit bi initially set to zero.
2. If x̂ and ri’s are consistent and valid (based on the Byzantine agreement protocol and the
verification stage of AVSS-Share respectively), set bi ← 1 in Step 2(a) of Thresh-Count.
3. Upon receiving 〈Done〉 from the parent quorum, run ACMPC using bi as the input. d← True
if a 5/8-fraction of the parties in Q have their bi’s set to one. Otherwise, d← False.
4. If d = False, then x̂← Default and ri ← 0.
4.2.2 Bounding the Expected Running Time
Consider N parties in a quorum who want to jointly compute a circuit of depth D using the protocol
ACMPC. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to the number of rounds until an instance
of ACMPC terminates. From [BCG93], we have
E[X] = O(D logN).
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Instead of running only one instance of ACMPC, we run O(logN) instances sequentially each for
2E[X] rounds. The output corresponding to the first instance that terminates will be returned as
the output of the gate. Using the Markov’s inequality,
Pr(X ≥ 2E[X]) ≤ 1/2.
In each gate of C, each party also participates in a run of Gen-Rand which itself calls AVSS-Share.
Similar to ACMPC, for each instance of AVSS-Share, we run O(logN) instances sequentially each
for 2E[X] rounds. The sharing corresponding to the first instance that terminates will be accepted
by the parties.
Since O(logN) instances of ACMPC and AVSS-Share are executed in each gate, the computation
of the gate correctly terminates after at most
2E[X] logN = O(D log2N)
rounds with high probability. Since C has m = poly(n) gates, using union bound over all gates of
C, our MPC algorithm correctly terminates with high probability. Finally, since C has depth d,
the expected running time of our asynchronous MPC protocol is O(Dd log2N). In Section 4.1.2,
we argued that the circuit computed by Circuit-Eval has depth D = polylog(n). Thus, the expected
running time of our protocol is O(d polylog(n)).
4.3 Remarks
As described in the introduction, the goal of MPC is to simulate a trusted third party in the
computation of the circuit, and then send back the computation result to the parties. Let S
denote the set of parties from whom input is received by the (simulated) trusted party. Recall
that |S| ≥ n− t.1 Thus, for an arbitrary S, a description of S requires Ω(n) bits, and cannot be
sent back to the parties using only a scalable amount of communication. Therefore, we relax the
standard requirement that S be sent back to the parties. Instead, we require that at the end of the
protocol each honest party learns the output of f ; whether or not their own input was included in
S; and the size of S.
Also note that although we have not explicitly included this in the input commitment step, it is
very easy for the parties to compute the size of the computation set S. Once each input quorum Qi
has performed the third step of Wait-For-Inputs and has agreed on the flag bi = 1, they can simply
use an addition circuit to add these bits together, and then disperse the result. This is an MPC,
all of whose inputs are held by honest parties, since each input flag bi is jointly held by the entire
quorum Qi, and all the quorums are good. Thus, the computation can afford to wait for all n inputs
and computes the correct sum.
In our both protocols, it may be the case that a party P participates more than one time in
the quorums performing a single instance of the classic MPC. In such a case, we allow P to play
the role of more than one different parties in CMPC and ACMPC, one for each quorum to which P
belongs. This ensures that the fraction of corrupted parties in any instance of the classic MPC is
always less than 1/3 for the synchronous case and 1/4 for the asynchronous case. We stress that
CMPC and ACMPC both maintain privacy guarantees even in the face of gossiping coalitions of
constant size. Thus, each party will learn no information beyond the output and its own inputs
after running these protocols.
1We allow |S| > n − t because the adversary is not limited to delivering one message at a time; two or more
messages may be received simultaneously.
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5 Proof of Theorem 2
We first describe the UC framework in Section 5.1, and then give a sketch of our proof in Section 5.2.
We prove the UC-security of Protocol 1 in sections 5.3 to 5.5. Finally, we calculate the resource
costs of this protocol in Section 5.7.
5.1 The UC Framework
The UC framework is based on the simulation paradigm [Gol00], where the protocol is considered
in two models: ideal and real. In the ideal model, the parties send their inputs to a trusted party
who computes the function and sends the outputs to the parties. We refer to the algorithm run by
the trusted party in the ideal model as the functionality of the protocol. In the real model, parties
run the actual protocol that assumes no trusted party. We refer to a run of the protocol in one of
these models as the execution of the protocol in that model.
A protocol P securely computes a functionality FP if for every adversary A in the real model,
there exists an adversary S in the ideal model, such that the result of a real execution of P with A
is indistinguishable from the result of an ideal execution with S. The adversary in the ideal model,
S, is called the simulator.
The simulation paradigm provides security only in the stand-alone model. To prove security
under composition, the UC framework introduces an adversarial entity called the environment,
denoted by Z, who generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and interacts with the
adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. The environment also chooses inputs
for the honest parties and gets their outputs when the protocol is finished.
A protocol is said to UC-securely compute an ideal functionality if for any adversary A that
interacts with the protocol there exists a simulator S such that no environment Z can tell whether
it is interacting with a run of the protocol and A, or with a run of the ideal model and S.
Now, consider a protocol P that has calls to ` subprotocols P1, ...,P` which are already proved
to be UC-secure. To facilitate the security proof of P, we can make use of the hybrid model, where
the subprotocols are assumed to be ideally computed by a trusted third-party. In other words, we
replace each call to a subprotocol with a call to its corresponding functionality. This hybrid model
is usually called the (P1, ...,P`)-hybrid model. We say P is UC-secure in the hybrid model if P in
the hybrid model is indistinguishable by the adversary from P in the ideal model. The modular
composition theorem [Can00] states that if P1, ...,P` are all UC-secure, and P is UC-secure in the
hybrid model, then P is UC-secure in the real model.
5.2 Proof Sketch
Before proceeding to the proof, we remark that the error probability in Theorem 2 comes entirely
from the possibility that Build-Quorums or the threshold counting procedure may fail to output
correct results. All other components of our protocol are deterministic and thus have no error
probability. We also assume that, at the beginning of our MPC protocol, the parties have already
agreed on n good quorums, and the threshold counting procedure is performed successfully.1
As in [Gol04], we refer to the security in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling t
parties t-security. For every gate u ∈ C, let Iu denote the set of the corrupted parties in the quorum
1For simplicity, we assume the primitive Build-Quorums is run only once, and it does not run concurrently with
other protocols.
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Table 2: Ideal functionalities
Functionality Implemented by
FBA Protocol BA
FVSS-Share Protocol VSS-Share
FVSS-Reconst Protocol VSS-Reconst
FCMPC Protocol CMPC
FGen-Rand Protocol Gen-Rand
FInput Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1
FCircuit-Eval Protocol Circuit-Eval
FOutput Output Reconstruction and Output
Propagation stages of Protocol 1
associated with u. Also, let I denote the set of all corrupted parties, where |I| < t.
Our goal is to prove the UC-security of Protocol 1. To do this, we must show two steps. Step
1) is to show that each of our subprotocols are UC-secure. Step 2) is to show that our protocol is
UC-secure in the hybrid model. Once we show these two steps, then by the modular composition
theorem, we conclude that our protocol is UC-secure in the real model.
In Lemma 6, we show Step 2, that the adversary can not distinguish the execution of the hybrid
model from the ideal model.
We next describe our approach to Step 1, which is more challenging. For this step, we make use
of a theorem that will help us show that our subprotocols are UC-secure. Kushilevitz et al. [KLR10]
show Theorem 3. This theorem targets perfectly-secure protocols that are shown secure using a
straight-line black-box simulator. A black-box simulator is a simulator that is given only oracle
access to the adversary (see [Gol00] Section 4.5 for a detailed definition). Such a simulator is
straight-line if it interacts with the adversary in the same way as real parties, meaning that it
proceeds round by round without ever going back.
Theorem 3 ([KLR10]). Every protocol that is perfectly-secure in the stand-alone model and has a
straight-line black-box simulator is UC-secure.
We first define the ideal functionalities shown in Table 2 that correspond to the subprotocols
used in Protocol 1. We then prove that Protocol 1 is t-secure in the (FBA, FVSS-Share, FVSS-Reconst,
FCMPC, FGen-Rand, FInput, FCircuit-Eval, FOutput)-hybrid model. Finally, we use Theorem 3 to infer the
UC-security of Protocol 1.
In order to prove the t-security of Protocol 1 in the hybrid model, we first show that all of
our subprotocols are UC-secure. Similar to the above approach, we first prove t-security of every
subprotocol in its corresponding hybrid model using a straight-line black-box simulator, and then
use Theorem 3 to infer its UC-security.
To prove the t-security of a protocol Π, we describe a simulator SΠ that simulates the real
protocol execution by running a copy of Π in the ideal model. For each call to a secure subprotocol
pi, the simulator calls the corresponding ideal functionality Fpi. A view of a corrupted party from
execution of a protocol is defined as the set of all messages it receives during the execution of
that protocol. At every stage of the simulation process, SΠ adds the messages received by every
corrupted party in that stage to its view of the simulation. This is achieved by running a copy of Π
for each corrupted party with its actual input as well as by running a copy of Π for each honest
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party with a dummy input.1 The view of the adversary is then defined as the combined view of all
corrupted parties.
5.3 Security of Input Commitment
Before proceeding to the proof of security for Input Commitment stage, we show the following
auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 1. If a quorum Q sends to a quorum Q′ a message M , it is eventually received by all
honest parties in Q′.
Proof. Recall that when Q sends M to Q′, every honest party in Q sends M to all parties in Q′. A
party in Q′ considers itself to have received the message M from Q if it receives M from at least 7/8
of the parties in Q. Since n quorums have successfully been formed, more than 7/8 of the parties
in each quorum are honest. In particular, this is true for Q. Thus, at least 7/8 of the members
of Q send M to each member of Q′. Since the adversary must eventually deliver all the messages
that have been sent, albeit with arbitrary delays, it follows that eventually each honest party in Q′
receives M from at least 7/8 of the members of Q.
We now proceed to the proof of the Input Commitment stage. The ideal functionality, FInput, is
given in Protocol 5. This functionality creates a set S containing the index of the parties whose
inputs have been accepted (as defined in Step 1 of Protocol 5) by the protocol to be used for the
computation. If a party’s input is not in S, then the functionality sets this input to the default
value. Next, the functionality sends each masked input x̂i to quorum Qi and secret-shares the mask
ri in Qi. In Lemma 2, we show the Input Commitment stage in Protocol 1 correctly implements
this functionality. Thus, the parties in Qi eventually either have received consistent VSS-shares of
xi and have agreed on x̂i = xi + ri as well as on i being in S or they have agreed that i /∈ S and
have set these values to the predefined value and rv and all its shares to 0. We say that a quorum
has come to agreement on X if all honest parties in the quorum agree on X.
Protocol 5 FInput
Goal. The functionality guarantees valid inputs are received by at least n− t input quorums. Then,
the functionality notifies all input quorums to proceed to the next stage of the protocol with either
a valid input or a default input.
Functionality:
1. Wait to receive at least n− t valid inputs from the set of all n parties. For every such input
xi, the functionality receives x̂i = xi + ri and ri from party Pi where i ∈ [n]. Let S denote the
set of parties whose inputs have been accepted (Note that if Pi ∈ S, then ŷi and ri are valid).
2. If Pi /∈ S, then define ŷi = 0 and ri = 0.
3. Broadcast 〈Done〉 and yi←xi + ri to Qi and run FVSS-Share to secret-share ri in Qi.
Lemma 2. The Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1 is UC-secure.
1SΠ learns neither the actual inputs nor the actual outputs of the honest parties.
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Proof. First, we show that corrupted parties cannot do anything but choose their input as they
wish; thus, the Input Commitment stage correctly computes FInput. This means that all honest
parties receive the 〈Done〉 message. Moreover, there exists a set S such that for every i ∈ [n], the
following statements hold:
1. All parties in Qi eventually agree whether i ∈ S or not.
2. At least n− t input quorums agree that their corresponding party’s index is in S.
3. All parties in Qi agree that party i ∈ S if and only if they collectively hold enough shares to
reconstruct Pi’s input. If all parties in Qi agree that i ∈ S, then party Pi’s input will be used
in the computation. Otherwise, the default value will be used instead.
First, since there are n − t honest parties, at least n − t valid inputs are eventually sent to
Thresh-Count. Based on Theorem 4, all parties will be notified when n− t inputs are received.
Each party in Qi has set its flag bit to either 1 or 0 depending on whether it has received a valid
input share from Pi. Let q = |Qi|. Upon receiving the 〈Done〉 message, the parties in Qi run the
third step of Wait-For-Inputs to decide whether at least 5q8 of them have set their flag bit to 1. If
they have, they assume i ∈ S.
If i ∈ S, then at least 7q8 of the parties in Qi have received input shares from Pi before they
received the 〈Done〉 message. Of these, more than 3q4 parties in Qi are honest and have set their
flag bit to 1. Since CMPC in Line 3 starts even if as many as q/8 inputs are missing, the parties in
Qi will correctly decide that at least
5q
8 flag bits among them are set to 1. Thus, the parties in Qi
all agree that i ∈ S. If i /∈ S, then CMPC in Line 3 has determined that less than 5q8 flag bits are
set to 1. Since Qi contains less than q/8 corrupted parties, more than q/2 parties set their flags to
0 and the parties in Qi all agree that i /∈ S. As a result, at least n− t input quorums agree that
their corresponding inputs are in S, and hence |S| ≥ n− t.
We prove the t-security of the Input Commitment stage in the (FVSS-Share, FVSS-Reconst,FCMPC)-
hybrid model which is similar to the Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1 except that every
call to its subprotocols is replaced with a call to their corresponding functionality. We define the
corresponding simulator SInput in Protocol 6.
Let V1 denote the view of the adversary from the hybrid execution, and V2 be its view from the
simulation. The inputs to Thresh-Count and Line 3 of Protocol 4 are completely independent of
the inputs of Protocol 1. Thus, V1 contains only the masked inputs, x̂i’s, and at most 1/8 fraction
of the shares for each random mask, ri’s. The masked inputs convey no information about the
inputs. Moreover, a 1/8 fraction of the shares are not enough to reconstruct the random number.
Since V2 contains all random elements, the adversary cannot distinguish V1 from V2. Since our
simulator is straight-line and black-box, it follows from Theorem 3 that the Input Commitment
stage is UC-secure.
5.4 Security of Circuit Evaluation
We first prove the security of Gen-Rand. The ideal functionality FGen-Rand is given in Protocol 7. At
least 7n/8 of the inputs ρ1, ..., ρN are sent by honest parties and thus are chosen uniformly and
independently at random from F. Hence, r =
∑N
i=1 ρi is also a uniform and independent random
element of F. This is because the sum of elements of F is uniformly random if at least one of them
is uniformly random.
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Protocol 6 SInput
For every i ∈ [n], party Pi holds an input xi ∈ F. Associated with this input, we consider a quorum
Qi. Let Ii denote the set of corrupted parties in Qi, and let I denote the set of all corrupted parties
among P1, ..., Pn.
Inputs. {ri}i∈[n], and {x̂i}i∈[n] from parties in I (set of all corrupted parties).
Simulation:
1. For every i ∈ [n], if Pi ∈ I, send xi + ri to all parties in Qi, and run FVSS-Share to secret-share
ri in Qi.
2. If Pi /∈ I,
(a) Choose ri and xi uniformly at random from F and x̂i ← xi + ri.
(b) Send x̂i to all parties in Qi.
(c) Run FVSS-Share to secret-share ri in Qi.
(d) For every party in Ii, add his share of ri and x̂i to his view.
3. For every party in Qi, run Wait-For-Inputs to wait for at least n− t inputs.
(a) Run FThresh-Count with flag bi initially set to zero to count the number of received inputs.
(b) If xi and ri are valid and consistent (based on the broadcast protocol and the verification
stage of VSS-Reconst respectively), raise an event to set bi ← 1 in FThresh-Count.
(c) Upon receiving 〈Done〉 from the parent quorum, run CMPC using bi as your input to
set d← True if a 5/8-fraction of the parties in Q have their bi’s set to one. Otherwise,
d← False.
(d) If d is set to False, then set y ← Default and ri ← 0.
Protocol 7 FGen-Rand
Goal. For a gate u ∈ C, generate a random value r ∈ F and VSS-share it among parties P1, ..., PN
in the quorum associated with u.
Functionality:
1. Receive inputs ρ1, ..., ρN ∈ F from P1, ..., PN respectively. For every i ∈ [N ], if Pi does not
send an input, then define ρi = 0.
2. Calculate r =
∑N
i=1 ρi and invoke FVSS-Share to send a share ri of r to Pi.
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Lemma 3. The protocol Gen-Rand is UC-secure.
Proof. We prove the t-security of Gen-Rand in the FVSS-Share-hybrid model which is similar to
Protocol 3 except that every call to VSS-Share is replaced with a call to the ideal functionality
FVSS-Share. The corresponding simulator SGen-Rand is given in Protocol 8.
Protocol 8 SGen-Rand
Inputs. For a gate u ∈ C, the inputs {ρj}Pj∈Iu of the corrupted parties P1, ..., PN in the quorum
associated with u.
Simulation:
1. For every Pi ∈ (Qu − Iu) (i.e., for every honest party Pi), call FVSS-Share with dummy input 0.
Let si1, ..., s
i
N denote the outputs.
2. For every Pj ∈ Iu,
(a) Run FVSS-Share with input ρj . Let ρ
j
1, ..., ρ
j
N denote the outputs. For every k ∈ [N ], add
ρkj to the view of Pj .
(b) Compute rj =
∑N
k=1 ρ
k
j and add rj to the view of Pj .
The views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid execution and the simulation are indistinguishable
because the only difference between the two views is that SGen-Rand generates the shares from dummy
input 0 instead of actual inputs. Since FVSS-Share generates uniform and independent random shares
from any input, the two views are identically distributed. Since our simulator is straight-line and
black-box, Gen-Rand is UC-secure.
We now proceed to the security proof of Circuit-Eval. The ideal functionality FCircuit-Eval is given
in Protocol 9.
Lemma 4. The protocol Circuit-Eval is UC-secure.
Proof. We first show that for each gate u ∈ C, FCircuit-Eval correctly computes ŷu = yu + ru. Based
on FInput and FGen-Rand, for each gate u ∈ C, the inputs of the honest parties in Qu are enough to
reconstruct ru. If u is an input gate not included in the computation from the Input Commitment
stage, then ru and its shares are 0. Thus, all three values of ru, rv, and rw can be correctly
reconstructed by the functionality since FVSS-Reconst can tolerate up to a 1/4 fraction of the inputs
being invalid.
We prove ŷu = yu + ru by induction on the height of u, where yu is the correct output of the
gate u. The base case is correct because based on the correctness of FInput, for each input gate
v′, we have ŷv′ = yv′ + rv′ and rv′ can correctly be reconstructed from the inputs received from
honest parties in Qv′ . Suppose that for all gates u
′ whose height is less than the height of u, the
functionality can compute ŷu′ = yu′ + ru′ and ru′ . This induction hypothesis is valid for v and w.
We now describe the induction step. In the computation of u, the functionality runs FCMPC. We
now argue based on the definition of the function computed by FCMPC that the output of FCMPC
is ŷu = ru + yu. By the induction hypothesis, the functionality can reconstruct correct rv and rw
and consequently it can correctly find yv and yw even if a 1/8 fraction of the inputs are missing. It
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Protocol 9 FCircuit-Eval
Goal. For each gate u ∈ C with children v, w ∈ C, 3N parties P1, ..., P3N provide inputs to the
functionality to allow it evaluate the functionality of u denoted by fu.
Functionality:
1. For every i ∈ [N ], receive ρi from Pi, ŷv and r(i)v from Pi+N , and ŷw and r(i)w from Pi+2N
respectively.
2. Run FGen-Rand with inputs ρ1, ..., ρN to generate r
(1)
u , ..., r
(N)
u .
3. Run FCMPC to locally compute the following functionality:
(a) ru ← FVSS-Reconst over r(1)u , ..., r(N)u .
(b) rv ← FVSS-Reconst over r(1)v , ..., r(N)v .
(c) rw ← FVSS-Reconst over r(1)w , ..., r(N)w .
(d) y1 ← ŷv − rv
(e) y2 ← ŷw − rw
(f) ŷu ← fu(y1, y2) + ru
is because the majority of the parties in Qv and Qw hold correct values of ŷv and ŷw. Thus, the
functionality can correctly compute fu(yv, yw) + ru.
We now prove the t-security of Circuit-Eval in the (FGen-Rand,FCMPC)-hybrid model which is
similar to Protocol 2 except that every call to CMPC and Gen-Rand is replaced with a call to FCMPC
and FGen-Rand respectively. The corresponding simulator SCircuit-Eval is given in Protocol 10.
We now show that the views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid execution and the simulation
are indistinguishable. After the evaluation of u, the following information will be added to the view
of every corrupted party Pi ∈ I4: ŷu and {r(j)u }Pj∈Iu . Recall that ŷu is the output of FCMPC during
the computation of u which is equal to yu + ru, and ru is a uniformly random element of F based
on FGen-Rand, independent of all other randomness in the algorithm.
First, if a corrupted party Pi is not in any of the quorums associated with u, v, and w, then no
additional information will be added to its view during the computation of u; thus, its view will be
identically distributed in the hybrid execution and the simulation.
Second, a corrupted party Pi ∈ I4 may add a share ru as well as shares of the individual random
elements whose sum is ru to its view in the computation of FGen-Rand. Also, it adds yu + ru to
its view. However, Pi cannot learn any additional information about the shares of ru (and thus
about ru) based on FCMPC and FGen-Rand. In other words, the parties in I4 are unable to directly
determine ru, since the only relevant inputs are the shares of ru, and they do not have enough of
those since they have fewer than half of them.
These parties also do not have enough shares of shares of ru to reconstruct it. However, they
add to their view shares of each of the other shares of ru multiple times: once during the input stage
of FCMPC in which u is involved, and once during the computation of the parent of u. Each time,
they do not get enough shares of shares ru to reconstruct any shares of ru. But, can they combine
the shares of shares from different runs for the same secret to gain some information? Since fresh
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Protocol 10 SCircuit-Eval
For every gate u ∈ C with children v, w ∈ C, consider three groups of parties Qu, Qv, and Qw, each
of whom have N parties. In each group, up to N/8 parties are corrupted.
Inputs. {ρi}Pi∈Iu , {r(i)u }Pi∈(Iv∪Iw), and ŷv and ŷw from parties in Iv ∪ Iw.
Simulation:
1. Run FGen-Rand with the following inputs: ρi for every Pi ∈ Iu and a dummy input for every
party in Qu − Iu. Let {r(i)u }Pi∈Qu denote the outputs. For every Pi ∈ Iu, add r(i)u to the view
of Pi.
2. Let Q4 = Qu ∪ Qv ∪ Qw and I4 = Iu ∪ Iv ∪ Iw. Run FCMPC to compute the functionality
defined in Line 3 of FCircuit-Eval with the following inputs: the input of every party in I4 as
described in FCircuit-Eval, and a dummy input for every party in Q4 − I4. Let ŷu denote the
output. For every party in I4, add ŷu to the view of the party.
and independent randomness was used by the dealers creating these shares on each run, the shares
from each run are independent of the other runs, and so they do not collectively give any more
information than each of the runs give separately. Since each run does not give the parties in I4
enough shares to reconstruct anything, it follows that they do not learn any information about ru.
Second, parties in I4 add shares of shares for rv and rw to their views. However, with a similar
argument as ru, they cannot reconstruct rv and rw as well even if these parties participate in one or
more of the instances of FCMPC which involve v or w: the computation of v or w themselves or the
computations of u as their parents.
Moreover, ŷu is also a random element in the field since ru is uniformly random and ŷu = yu+ ru.
Thus, ŷu holds no information about yu, and the corrupted parties cannot learn any information
about yu except what is implicit in his input and the circuit output. This means that the corrupted
parties cannot distinguish if they are participating in a run of the hybrid model or the simulation.
Finally, since SCircuit-Eval is straight-line and black-box, Circuit-Eval is UC-secure.
5.5 Security of Output Stages
The ideal functionality for the Output Reconstruction and the Output Propagation stages of
Protocol 1 are given in Protocol 11.
Protocol 11 FOutput
Goal. The functionality guarantees the output is reconstructed correctly and it is learned by all
honest parties.
Functionality:
1. Run FVSS-Reconst to reconstruct the output.
2. Send the output to all the parties.
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Lemma 5. The Output Reconstruction and Output Propagation stages of Protocol 1 are UC-secure.
Proof. We first show that the two stages correctly compute FOutput. Let z be the output gate of C.
By Lemma 4, all parties in the output quorum Qz eventually agree on yz + rz and hold shares of rz.
In the Output Reconstruction stage, these parties run the VSS-Reconst. Since at least a 7/8 fraction
of them are honest, they correctly reconstruct rz. Since all honest parties in Qz know yz + rz and
subtract from it the reconstructed rz, they all eventually learn yz. Thus, all parties in Qz eventually
learn yz.
We now show by induction that all honest parties eventually learn yz. Since Q1 is assigned to
the output gate, it provides a base case. For i > 1, consider the parties in Qi, and for all j < i
assume the correct output is learned by all parties in Qj . During the Output Propagation stage,
the parties in Qi receive putative values for the output from the parties at Qbi/2c. Since Qbi/2c is
good, and by induction hypothesis all honest parties in it have learned the correct output, it follows
that all honest parties in quorum Qbi/2c send the same message which is the correct output. By
Lemma 1, all honest parties in Qi eventually learn the correct output. By induction, all the parties
learn the correct value.
We now prove the t-security of the output stages in the FVSS-Reconst-hybrid model. The corre-
sponding simulator SOutput is given in Protocol 12. The views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid
Protocol 12 SOutput
Inputs. For the output gate z and the corresponding quorum Qz, the inputs of the simulator are
{r(i)z }Pi∈Iz , and ŷz from parties in Iz.
Simulation:
1. Run FVSS-Reconst with inputs {r(i)z }Pi∈Iz and dummy inputs for honest parties. Add the output
to the view of parties in Iz.
2. For every i ∈ {2, ..., n}, parties in Qi perform the following steps:
(a) Receive y from Qbi/2c and add it to the view of every parties in Ibi/2c.
(b) Send y to all parties in Q2i and Q2i+1.
execution and the simulation are indistinguishable since the only message that is added to the view
of the adversary is the output. Based on the security definition of MPC, the adversary is allowed to
learn the output.
5.6 Security of Protocol 1
We now show that our main protocol is UC-secure.
Lemma 6. Protocol 1 is UC-secure.
Proof. Canetti [Can95] proves the t-security of VSS-Share, VSS-Reconst, and CMPC using straight-
line black-box simulators. So, based on Theorem 3, these protocols are UC-secure. Moreover,
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Lindell et al. [LLR06] show that any Byzantine agreement protocol in the standard model (such as
the protocol of [CR93]) is UC-secure. Hence, the Byzantine agreement of [FM88] is also UC-secure.
Protocol 1 is t-secure since in lemmas 2, 4, and 5 we showed that all stages of the Protocol 1 are
t-secure. Based on Theorem 3, since we have proved the t-security of Protocol 1 using a straight-line
black-box simulator, the protocol is also UC-secure.
5.7 Cost Analysis
We now analyze the resource costs of Protocol 1.
Lemma 7. During the Input stage, each quorum sends at most O(log n) messages.
Proof. For the input stage, each quorum is mapped to at most one of the input gates and hence one
of the nodes in the count tree. Thus, from Theorem 4 it follows that the total number of messages
sent by each quorum is O(log n). Since each quorum has log n parties, an additional polylog(n)
messages are sent by each quorum during VSS-Share and VSS-Reconst to check whether the input is
correctly secret-shared.
Lemma 8. If all honest parties follow Protocol 1, then with high probability, each party sends at
most O˜(m/n+
√
n) messages.
Proof. By Theorem 6, we need to send O˜(
√
n) messages per party to build the quorums. Subsequently,
each party must send messages for each quorum in which it is a member. Recall that each party is
in Θ(log n) quorums.
By Lemma 7, each quorum sends O˜(log(n)) messages during Input stage. Recall that each
quorum is mapped to Θ
(
m+n
n
)
nodes of C. A quorum runs Gen-Rand and the gate evaluation
step of Circuit-Eval once per node it is mapped to in C. Since each gate has in-degree two and
out-degree at most two, a quorum runs CMPC at most three times for every node it is mapped to
in C. Also, at most polylog(n) messages are sent per party per instance of CMPC, Gen-Rand, and
gate evaluation. Finally, each quorum sends O(log n) messages in the dissemination of the output.
Thus, each quorum sends polylog(n) messages per node it represents. It follows that each party
sends O˜(m/n+
√
n) messages.
Lemma 9. If all honest parties follow Protocol 1, with high probability, the total latency is
O(dpolylog(n)) where d is depth of the circuit the protocol computes.
Proof. Based on Theorem 6, the latency for creating quorums is polylog(n). Based on Theorem 4,
the latency for the Thresh-Count algorithm is O(log n) which implies that the Input Commitment
stage also has polylog(n) latency.
In the computation of the circuit, to evaluate the gate g in the upper level of the circuit, first its
input gates in lower level of the circuit must be evaluated. This implies that the evaluation of the
circuit is level by level and the latency for evaluating the circuit is O(d) times the latency of CMPC
over log n parties.
6 Asynchronous Threshold Counting
In this section, we present an asynchronous Monte Carlo algorithm called Thresh-Count which solves
the threshold counting problem and provides the following theorem proved in Section 6.4.
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Our threshold counting algorithm runs in a setting with n honest parties in a fully-connected
network with private and authenticated channels and asynchronous communication. In our asyn-
chronous MPC protocol presented in Section 4, we run Thresh-Count among a set of quorums, where
each quorum represents an honest party.
Theorem 4. The algorithm Thresh-Count solves the threshold counting problem with high probability,
while ensuring:
1. Each party sends at most O(log n) messages of constant size,
2. Each party receives at most O(log n) messages,
3. Each party performs O(log n) computations,
4. Total latency is O(log n).
Recall that in the threshold counting problem there are n honest parties in an asynchronous
communication network with private channels. Each party has an input flag which is initially 0.
At least τ of the parties’ bits will eventually be set to 1 based on an external event. When this
happens, we say the threshold is reached. The goal is for each of the parties to terminate at some
time after the threshold is reached.
Although in our application τ is linear in n, we address the more general case, where τ = O(n).
Our algorithm depends on prior knowledge of τ . As specified in Theorem 4, each party running the
algorithm sends and receives O(log n) messages of constant size and performs O(log n) computations;
moreover the total latency is O(log n).
For ease of presentation, we first describe an algorithm which works when τ = Θ(n), in particular,
when τ is at least n/2. We then indicate why this fails when τ is smaller, and show how to modify
it so that it works for all τ . The formal algorithm is shown as Protocol 13.
Consider a complete binary tree where each party sends its input to a unique leaf node when it
is set to 1. Then, for every node v, each child of v sends v a message giving the number of inputs it
has received so far and it sends a new message every time this number changes. The problem with
this approach is that it is not load-balanced: each node at depth i has n/2i descendants in the tree,
and therefore, in the worst case, sends and receives n/2i messages. Thus, a child of the root sends
n/2 messages to the root and receives the same number of messages from its children.
To solve the load-balancing problem, we use a randomized approach which ensures with high
probability that each leaf of the data structure receives at least 7 log n messages and does not
communicate with its parent until it has done so. Subsequent messages it receives are not forwarded
to its parent but rather to other randomly chosen leaves to ensure a close to uniform distribution of
the messages.
Our algorithm consists of up and down stages. For the up stage the parties are arranged in a
predetermined tree data structure, which we call the count tree. The count tree consists of a root
node with O(log n) children, each of which is itself the root of a complete binary tree; these subtrees
have varying depths as depicted in Figure 4. In the up stage, parties in the trees count the number
of 1-inputs, i.e., the number of parties’ inputs that are set to 1. The root then eventually decides
when the threshold is reached. In the down stage, the root notifies all the parties of this event via a
complete binary tree of depth log n. Note that the tree used in the down stage has the same root as
the count tree.
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Figure 4: The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 1232. D = dlog 123214×11e = 3. The node marked R is
the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes, and nodes marked C are collection nodes.
Let D = dlog τ14 logne. Note that D = O(log n). The root of the count tree has degree D. Each
of the D children of the root is itself the root of a complete binary subtree, which we will call a
collection subtree. For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, the jth collection subtree has depth D+ 1− j. Party 1 is assigned
to the root and parties 2 to D + 1, are assigned to its children, i.e., the roots of the collection
subtrees, with party j + 1 being assigned to the jth child. The remaining nodes of the collection
trees are assigned parties in order, starting with D + 2, left to right and top to bottom. One can
easily see that the entire data structure has fewer than n nodes, (in fact it has fewer than τ3 logn
nodes) so some parties will not be assigned to any node.
The leaves of each collection subtree are collection nodes, while the internal nodes of each
collection tree are adding nodes.
6.1 Up Stage
When a party’s input is set to 1, it sends a 〈Flag〉 message, which we will sometimes simply refer to
as a flag, to a uniformly random collection node from the first collection subtree. Intuitively, we
want the flags to be distributed as evenly as possible among the collection nodes. The parameters of
the algorithm are set up so that with high probability each collection node receives at least 7 log n
〈Flag〉 messages.
Each collection node in the j-th collection tree waits until it has received 7 log n flags. It then
sends its parent a 〈Count〉 message. For each additional flag received, up to 14 log n, it chooses
a uniformly random collection node in the (j + 1)-st collection subtree and forwards a flag to it.
If j = D, then it forwards these 14 log n flags directly to the root. Subsequent flags are ignored.
Again, we use the randomness to ensure a close to even distribution of flags with high probability.
Each adding node waits until it has received a 〈Count〉 message from each of its children. Then,
it sends a 〈Count〉 message to its parent. We note that, with high probability, each adding node
sends exactly one message during the algorithm. The parameters of the algorithm are arranged so
that all the 〈Count〉 messages that are sent in the the jth collection subtree together account for
τ/2j of the 1-inputs. Thus, all the 〈Count〉 messages in all the collection subtrees together account
for τ
(
1− 1
2D
)
of the 1-inputs. At least τ
2D
1-inputs remain unaccounted for. These 1-inputs and up
to O(log n) more are collected as flags at the root.
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Figure 5: The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 616. D = dlog 61614×11e = 2. The node marked R is
the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes and nodes marked C are collection nodes. The filters,
marked F , are complete binary trees of depth 7, with 128 leaves each, for a total of 512 filter leaves.
6.2 Down Stage
When party 1, at the root, has accounted for at least τ 1-inputs, it starts the down stage by sending
the 〈Done〉 message to parties 2 and 3. For j > 1, when party j receives the 〈Done〉 message, it
forwards this message to parties 2j and 2j + 1. Thus, eventually the 〈Done〉 message reaches all the
parties, who then learn that the threshold has been met.
Note that all three types of messages sent in this protocol, 〈Flag〉, 〈Count〉 and 〈Done〉, are
notifications only; they do not contain any numerical value. Since 2 bits are sufficient to distinguish
three different kinds of messages, all the messages sent in this protocol are 2-bit strings. Note that
we distinguish between flags and 〈Count〉 messages since the root receives both kinds. However it is
the only node for which this is a problem. We could add another node, as the (D + 1)st child of the
root, (equivalently as a collection subtree of depth 0,) which waits for 14 log n messages, and sends
a 〈Count〉 message to the root. In so doing, we could eliminate the need to explicitly distinguish
〈Flag〉 and 〈Count〉 message, since they would be automatically distinguished by the role of the
receiving node. Thus, we could actually reduce all message lengths to a single bit.
6.3 Handling Sublinear Thresholds
Now, we consider the case where τ = o(n). It is easy to see that the worst load in terms of the
number of received messages is when all n inputs are 1. In this case, a collection node in the first
collection subtree receives, on average, 14(n/τ) log n flags. When τ = Θ(n), this is still O(log n),
but when τ = o(n) this is ω(log n). Before we describe how to fix this, we note that the problem
exists only in the leaves of the first collection subtree. Subsequent collection nodes receive only
O(log n) flags, because each node only forwards up to 14 log n flags.
For the sake of having a definite cutoff and tractable constants, we will apply the following fix
whenever τ < n/2. Below each collection node in the first collection tree, we put in a filter, which is
a complete binary tree of depth log n− 2−D with 7n logn2τ leaves. This is equivalent to extending
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the first collection tree to depth log n− 2 so that it has n/4 leaves. The collection nodes will remain
at depth D though. See Figure 5.
When a party’s input is set to 1, it selects a random collection node in the first collection tree,
but rather than sending a flag directly to it, it sends the flag to a random leaf of the collection
node’s filter. The nodes in the filter simply forward any flags they receive, up to 21 log n, to their
parent in the filter. Subsequent flags are ignored. Clearly, this means that the collection node at the
root of the filter cannot receive more than 42 log n flags, which solves the load problem. Moreover,
we have not simply transfered the problem to the leaves of the filter. Since there are so many
more of them, each one actually receives fewer flags on average and the parameters are adjusted to
make their maximum load O(log n) with high probability. As we will also see in the analysis, these
filters do not filter out too many flags; when there are only τ 1-inputs among the parties, with high
probability all the flags get through.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we prove the correctness and resource costs of Protocol 13. The process of each
party independently selecting a random collection node to notify after its input has been set to 1
can be modeled as a balls and bins problem and hence be approximated by the Poisson distribution.
6.4.1 Preliminaries
We first recall the following Chernoff bound for a Poisson random variable from Mitzenmacher and
Upfal [MU05].
Theorem 5 (Theorem 5.4 of [MU05]). Let Y ∼ Poisson(µ). Then,
1. for x < µ, Prob(Y ≤ x) ≤ e−µ(eµ/x)x, and
2. for x > µ, Prob(Y ≥ x) ≤ e−µ(eµ/x)x.
Lemma 10. Assume αk balls are thrown independently and uniformly at random into k bins. Let
E1 denote the event that the minimum load is less than α/2, and let E2 denote the event that the
maximum load exceeds 3α/2. Then,
Prob(E1) ≤ ek
√
αk
(
2
e
)α/2
(1)
and
Prob(E2) ≤ ek
√
αk
(
8e
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)α/2
. (2)
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Xi denote the number of balls in the ith bin, and let Yi ∼ Poisson(α) be
an independent Poisson random variable with mean α. It is well known that the distribution of each
Xi is close to that of Yi, and moreover that the joint distribution of the Xi’s is well approximated by
the joint (i.e., product) distribution of the Yi’s (see Chapter 5 in Mitzenmacher and Upfal [MU05]).
Indeed, Corollary 5.11 from [MU05] states that for any event E that is monotone in the number
of balls, if E occurs with probability at most p in the Poisson approximation, then E occurs with
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Protocol 13 Thresh-Count
Goal. n is the number of parties, τ is the threshold, b is a flag bit initially set to zero which may
be set to one by an external event throughout the protocol and D = dlog( τ14 logn)e. The algorithm
notifies all the parties upon receiving τ flag bits set to one.
1. Setup. No messages sent in this stage:
(a) Build the count tree and set party 1 as the root:
For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, party j + 1 is a child of the root (and the root of the jth collection
subtree with depth D + 1− j). Starting with party D + 2, the remainder of the nodes
are assigned to parties, left to right and top to bottom. If τ < n/2 the remaining parties
are assigned to filters, left to right and top to bottom.
(b) Let sum = 0 for the root.
2. Up Stage.
(a) Upon b = 1, choose a uniformly random collection node v from collection subtree 1,
• If τ > n/2, send a 〈Flag〉 to v.
• Otherwise, choose a uniformly random leaf in v’s filter and send a 〈Flag〉 to it.
(b) Upon receiving a 〈Flag〉, if previously forwarded fewer than 21 log n flags, forward the
flag to parent. Otherwise, ignore it.
(c) Perform the following steps to collect nodes in the collection subtree j:
• Upon receiving 7 log n 〈Flag〉s, send parent a 〈Count〉 message.
• Upon subsequently receiving a 〈Flag〉, if j < D, send it to a uniformly random
collection node in collection subtree j + 1. If j = D, then send it directly to the root.
Do this for up to 14 log n flags. Then, ignore all subsequent 〈Flag〉 messages.
(d) Upon receiving 〈Count〉 from both children, send 〈Count〉 to the parent.
(e) If sum < τ ,
• Upon receiving a 〈Count〉 from party j + 1, set sum← sum+ τ/2j .
• Upon receiving a 〈Flag〉, sum← sum+ 1.
3. Down Stage. If sum ≥ τ ,
(a) Party 1 (the root): Send 〈Done〉 to parties 2 and 3, and then terminate.
(b) Party j for j > 1: Upon receiving 〈Done〉 from party bj/2c, forward it to parties 2j and
2j + 1 (if they exist), and then terminate.
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probability at most 2p in the exact case. Since maximum and minimum load are both clearly
monotone increasing in the number of balls, applying this corollary we have:
Prob(E1) = Prob (∃i s.t. Xi ≤ α/2)
≤ 2 Prob (∃i s.t. Yi ≤ α/2)
≤ 2
k∑
i=1
Prob
(
Yi ≤ α
2
)
≤ 2k
(
2
e
)α/2
,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 5 with µ = α and x = α/2. Similarly,
Prob(E2) = Prob (∃i s.t. Xi > 3α/2)
≤ 2 Prob (∃i s.t. Yi > 3α/2)
≤ 2
k∑
i=1
Prob
(
Yi ≥ 3α
2
)
≤ 2k
(
8e
27
)α/2
,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 5 with µ = α and x = 3α/2.
6.4.2 Protocol Analysis
Let σ be the number of 1-inputs. We know that τ ≤ σ ≤ n. Let s = σ/τ . For simplicity of the
analysis, we will assume that the first τ flags to be sent are marked while the remaining σ − τ are
unmarked. As we track the progress of the flags through our data structure, we pay particular
attention to the marked flags. Due to asynchrony, the marked flags need not be the first τ to arrive
at their destinations.
Lemma 11. Suppose τ ≥ n/2. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1− 17n logn ,
the first collection subtree satisfies all of the following:
1. Each collection node receives between 7s log n and 21s log n flags.
2. The 〈Count〉 messages generated in this tree, when they reach the root, account for τ/2 1-inputs.
3. At least τ/2 and at most τ flags are forwarded to the second collection tree.
Proof. The process of sending σ 〈Flag〉 messages to the collection nodes in the first collection tree
can be modeled as a balls and bins problem as in Lemma 10 with α = 14s log n and k = τ/14 log n.
E1 and E2 are, respectively, the events that some collection node fails to receive 7s log n flags and
that some collection node receives more than 21s log n flags. By applying the lemma, we get
Prob(E1) ≤ 2τ
14 log n
(
2
e
)7s logn
≤ 2n
14 log n
2−0.4426×7s logn
≤ 1
7n2s log n
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and
Prob(E2) ≤ 2τ
14 log n
(
8e
27
)7s logn
≤ 2n
14 log n
2−0.3121×7s logn
≤ 1
7n1.1s log n
Thus, the probability that (a) fails is at most 1+n
0.9s
7n2s logn
.
To see (b), we note that there are τ/(14 log n) collection nodes in the first collection subtree,
each of whom generates a 〈Count〉 message when it has received 7 log n flags. The flags correspond
to distinct 1-inputs, and hence together they account for τ/2 1-inputs. Thus, (b) fails only if some
node fails to receive at least 7 log n flags, which is already accounted for in the failure of (a).
To prove (c), we need to track the progress of the marked flags. Let E′1 and E′2 denote respectively,
the events that some node fails to receive at least 7 log n marked flags and that some node receives
more than 21 log n marked flags. Then, since there are τ marked flags, applying Lemma 10 with
α = 14 log n and k = τ/14 log n we see that
Prob(E′1) ≤
2τ
14 log n
(
2
e
)7 logn
≤ 2n
14 log n
2−0.4426×7 logn
≤ 1
7n2 log n
and
Prob(E′2) ≤
2τ
14 log n
(
8e
27
)7 logn
≤ 2n
14 log n
2−0.3121×7 logn
≤ 1
7n1.1 log n
.
Within each collection node, by transferring the marks from some marked flags to some unmarked
flags, we may assume that the marked flags are the first to arrive. We can do this transfer because
it does not change the distribution of marked and unmarked flags between the nodes, nor does it
change the total number of marked flags across all collection nodes. The advantage of this change is
that in following the algorithm, each node will first use all its marked flags before using unmarked
flags.
In particular, as long as E′1 and E′2 do not occur, each node will use 7 log n flags to generate
a 〈Count〉 message, after which it will be left with between 0 and 14 log n marked flags. Since it
forwards up to 14 log n flags to the next collection subtree, it follows that it will forward all of its
marked flags and possibly some unmarked flags to the next subtree. Since there are τ marked flags
across all the collection nodes, and the 〈Count〉 messages account for τ/2 of them, it follows that the
remaining τ/2 marked flags are forwarded. Hence, at least τ/2 flags are forwarded. Moreover, since
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there are τ/(14 log n) nodes and each forwards at up to 14 log n flags, at most τ flags are forwarded,
which establishes (c).
Now, let E = E1 ∪E2 ∪E′1 ∪E′2 be the union of all the bad events we’ve encountered. For large
enough n,
Prob(E) ≤ 1
7n2s log n
+
1
7n1.1s log n
+
1
7n2 log n
+
1
7n1.1 log n
≤ 1
7n log n
Thus, with probability at least 1− 17n logn , (a), (b), and (c) are all true, as desired.
We will also need to prove a similar lemma when τ < n/2. Note that when τ ≥ n/2, we have
σ ≤ 2τ , or s = σ/τ ≤ 2. When τ < n/2, σ may be much bigger than τ . Let M = min{σ/τ, 2}.
Lemma 12. Suppose τ < n/2. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1− 17n logn ,
the first collection subtree satisfies all of the following:
1. Each collection node receives between 7 log n and 21M log n flags.
2. Each filter node receives at most 21M log n flags.
3. The 〈Count〉 messages generated in this tree, when they reach the root, account for τ/2 1-inputs.
4. At least τ/2 and at most τ flags are forwarded to the second collection tree.
Proof. When τ < n/2, the flags are not sent directly to the collection nodes, but rather to leaf
nodes of the filters below the collection nodes. We will say that a filter receives a flag if the flag is
received by any of its leaf nodes.
We first note that each party’s process of selecting a random collection node, and then selecting
a random leaf in its filter, is equivalent to simply selecting a uniformly random leaf node from among
all the leaf nodes for all the filters. We’ve already remarked that adding the filters is equivalent
to extending the first collection subtree to depth log n − 2 while keeping the collection layer the
same. Thus, there are n/4 filter leaf nodes to choose from. Using the Poisson approximation
and an argument similar to the one in Lemma 10, it is easy to see that when σ ≤ n parties each
independently send a flag to a uniformly random filter leaf node out of n/4 choices, the probability
of the event E0, that there is a leaf node that receives more than 21 log n flags is less than n
− log logn.
Once the flags have been sent to the leaf nodes of the filters, they are forwarded up the filter
from nodes to their parents, all the way to the collection node, with the only caveat that nodes do
not forward more than 21 log n flags. Since each node has two children, it follows that each node in
the filter receives at most 42 log n flags, and the same is true of the collection nodes. At the same
time, viewing the process as first selecting a collection node, and then a filter leaf node below it, we
see as in Lemma 11 that the probability of the event E2, that there is a filter that receives more
than 21s log n flags is at most 1
7n1.1s logn
. Since no node in the filter can get more flags than the
filter as a whole, it follows that the filter nodes and the collection nodes all receive no more than
21M log n = min{21s log n, 42 log n} flags. This shows (b) and the upper bound in (a).
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To show that the collection nodes each receives at least 7 log n flags with high probability, and
that together the collection nodes receive at least τ flags, we will once again track the marked flags.
As we have remarked previously, although the marked flags are the first τ to be sent, by asynchrony,
they need not be the first τ to arrive at the filters. Thus, it need not be the case that all these
marked flags are forwarded through to the collection nodes. Nevertheless, we will argue that for
every marked flag that fails to be forwarded, at least one unmarked flag was forwarded instead. To
see this, note that as in Lemma 11, all the filters receive between 7 log n and 21 log n marked flags,
except with probability 1+n
0.9
7n2 logn
. Thus, each node in a filter can have at most 21 log n marked flags
arrive at it.
Now, suppose a filter node fails to forward one or more marked flags. It can only do this if it has
previously forwarded 21 log n flags, and since it can receive at most 21 log n marked flags, it follows
that it has already forwarded at least as many unmarked flags as it is choosing to ignore marked
ones. Once again, by transferring marks from the marked flags that are dropped to the unmarked
flags that have been sent in their place, we can ensure that except with probability 1+n
0.9
7n2 logn
, between
7 log n and 21 log n marked flags get through each filter to the corresponding collection node, and at
least τ marked flags get through all the filters together, to the collection layer of the first collection
subtree. This shows the lower bound in (a) and sets us up to show (c) and (d).
For (c), we will once again pretend, by transferring marks that at each node the marked flags
are the first to arrive and be used. As before, we do this without altering the distribution of marked
and unmarked flags between collection nodes. Note that each newly marked flag at the collection
node corresponds to a distinct 1-input, so the 7 log n of them used by each of τ/(14 log n) collection
nodes to generate a 〈Count〉 message accounts for τ/2 1-inputs at the root. This leaves between
0 and 14 log n marked flags at each collection node which add up to τ/2 of them across all the
collection nodes. Since each collection node forwards up to 14 log n flags, all the marked flags are
forwarded, so that at least τ/2 flags are forwarded to the next collection subtree. Since each of
τ/(14 log n) collection nodes forwards up to 14 log n flags, at most τ flags are forwarded to the next
collection tree, proving (d).
Finally, adding up the probabilities of all the bad events we’ve encountered, we see that for
large enough n, 1+n
0.9
7n2 logn
+ 1
7n1.1 logn
+ n− log logn < 17n logn . It follows that with probability at least
1− 17n logn , (a), (b), (c), and (d) are all true, as desired.
We are now ready to study what happens further up in the data structure. We will say that the
algorithm succeeds up to level j if for all i ≤ j the following are true:
1. All the collection nodes in the ith collection subtree receive between 7 log n and 42 log n flags.
2. The 〈Count〉 messages generated in the ith subtree account for τ/2i 1-inputs at the root.
3. Between τ/2i and τ/2i−1 flags are forwarded from the ith collection subtree to the (i+ 1)st
collection subtree
Lemma 13. Let j ≤ D. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1 − j7n logn , the
algorithm succeeds up to level j.
Proof. We proceed by induction on j. We have already established the base case j = 1 in Lemmas 11
and 12. Now suppose j ≥ 2, and for an induction hypothesis we assume that the algorithm succeeds
to level j − 1 with probability at least 1− j−17n logn . Let us condition on this event. This means that
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between τ/2j−1 and τ/2j−2 flags are forwarded to the jth collection subtree, which has τ
2j−114 logn
collection nodes.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 10 with α between 14 log n and 28 log n. The proof that conditioned
on the algorithm having succeeded up to level j − 1, it succeeds to level j, except with probability
1
7n logn , is identical to the proof of Lemma 11. By Bayes’ law and the induction hypothesis, the
unconditional probability that the algorithm succeeds to level j(
1− j − 1
7n log n
)(
1− 1
7n log n
)
≥ 1− j
7n log n
,
as desired.
Corollary 1. With probability at least 1 − 17n , the root node successfully accounts for at least τ
1-inputs.
Proof. The last collection subtree is the one corresponding to j = D, and by Lemma 13, with
probability at least 1 − D7 logn the root has accounted for
∑D
j=1 τ/2
j = τ(1 − 2−D) 1-inputs, and
moreover, between τ/2D and τ/2D−1 flags have been forwarded directly to the root, by the collection
nodes in the last collection subtree. Since no randomness is involved, the root eventually receives
all of these flags. Thus, conditioned on the algorithm succeeding up to level D, the root eventually
accounts for at least τ 1-inputs. Since D < log τ < log n, the success probability is at least
1− 17n .
We now prove the Theorem 4. Lemmas 11 to 13 and Corollary 1 show that with probability at
least 1− 17n , the root accounts for at least τ 1-inputs while ensuring the following:
1. Filter nodes receive no more than 42 log n messages and send no more than 21 log n messages.
2. Collection nodes receive no more than 42 log n messages and send no more than 14 log n+ 1
messages. (The extra 1 is for the 〈Count〉 message.)
3. The root receives no more than τ/2D−1 = 28 log n 〈Flag〉 messages.
Additionally, the adding nodes each receive two 〈Count〉 messages and send one 〈Count〉 message, and
the root receives D ≤ log n 〈Count〉 messages, one from each of the collection subtrees. Individual
parties send at most one message each, when their input is set to 1. We have already remarked
that the messages used in this algorithm can be encoded using two bits. Thus, in the Up stage
of the algorithm each party sends and receives O(log n) messages of constant size. In the Down
stage, 〈Done〉 messages are sent via a canonical complete binary tree, so each party except the root
receives exactly one 〈Done〉 message, and each party that is not a leaf in the tree sends (at most)
two 〈Done〉 messages. Since all messages that are sent are eventually received, eventually all the
parties receive the 〈Done〉 message and terminate. Since the depths of the data structure used in the
Up stage and the binary tree used in the Down stage are both log n, the longest chain of messages
is of length 2 log n, and hence the total latency is O(log n). Finally, since the computations done
by each node during the algorithm amount to counting the number of messages it receives and
generating up to 14 log n random numbers, each node performs O(log n) computations.
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6.5 Using Quorums as Nodes in the Count Tree
So far in this section, we have assumed that all of the nodes in the count tree follow the protocol
honestly. However, this is not the case in our MPC model, where some of the parties can play
maliciously. To fix this, we assign a quorum to each node in the tree and let the quorums perform
the roles of the parties. In our MPC protocol described in Section 4, we introduce Protocol 4 that
allows us run the threshold counting algorithm in a malicious setting.
Lemma 1 shows that a quorum Q can securely send a message M to another quorum Q′. However,
there is some subtlety involved in using this fact. Every party in a quorum communicates with its
parent when it has received at least half as many inputs as the parents’ threshold. However, due to
asynchrony, multiple messages may arrive simultaneously; when the threshold is set, not all parties
in the quorum may be in the same state. Some may already have more inputs than the threshold,
while others may still be waiting, because messages from their children have been delayed. Lemma 1
tells us that if all parties in the quorum send the same message to the parent quorum, then the
parent quorum can resolve that message. Thus, in order to ensure that all parties in the quorum
send the same message to the parent quorum, we have required that even if a party’s received inputs
exceed his threshold, it should only inform the parent of having met the threshold, not of having
exceeded it. The remaining inputs are held to be sent later.
7 Asynchronous Quorum Formation
In this section, we describe the quorum building algorithm of King et al. [KSSV06b, KLST11], and
then adapt it to the asynchronous communication model by proving the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Consider n parties connected to each other pairwise in an asynchronous network,
where up to t < (14 − )n of them are corrupted, for some small constant  > 0. If all honest parties
follow the protocol Build-Quorums, then with high probability,
1. the parties agree on n quorums,
2. each party sends at most O˜(
√
n) field elements,
3. each party performs O˜(
√
n) computations, and
4. the protocol latency is O(polylog(n)).
One may alternatively use the asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol of Braud-Santoni et
al. [BGH13] to build a set of n quorums. This protocol requires each party on average to send
polylog(n) field elements, and perform polylog(n) computations. However, it is not load-balanced:
some parties may send a linear number of field elements. Using this result our MPC protocol needs
only logarithmic bits and computations.
We start the description of our protocol by defining the semi-random-string agreement problem,
where the goal is to agree on a single string of length O(log n) with a constant fraction for random
bits, where for any positive constant , a 1/2 +  fraction of the parties are honest. King et
al. [KLST11] present an asynchronous algorithm as an additional result that we call SRS-to-Quorum.
The SRS-to-Quorum algorithm can go from a solution for semi-random-string agreement problem
to the solution for the quorum building problem. Thus, their techniques can be extended to the
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asynchronous model assuming a scalable asynchronous solution for the semi-random-string agreement
problem. We describe Build-Quorums algorithm based on SRS-to-Quorum and an algorithm, that
solves semi-random-string agreement problem in the asynchronous model with pairwise channels
that we call SRS-Agreement.
Protocol 14 Build-Quorums
Goal. Generate n quorums.
1. All parties run SRS-Agreement.
2. All parties run SRS-to-Quorum.
King et al. [KSSV06b] present a synchronous algorithm that a set of parties, up to 1/3 of which
are controlled by an adversary, can reach almost-everywhere1 agreement with probability 1− o(1).
Their main technique is to divide the parties into groups of polylogarithmic size; each party is
assigned to multiple groups. In parallel, each group uses bin election algorithm [Fei99] to elect a
small number of parties from within their group to move on. This step is recursively repeated on
the set of elected parties until size of the remaining parties in this set becomes polylogarithmic. At
this point, the remaining parties can solve the semi-random-string agreement problem (similarly,
they can run a Byzantine agreement protocol to agree on a bit). Provided the fraction of corrupted
parties in the set of remaining parties is less than 1/3 with high probability, these parties succeed in
agreeing on a semi-random string. Then, these parties communicate the result value to the rest of
the parties.
Bringing parties to agreement on a semi-random string is trickier in the asynchronous model.
The major difficulty is that the bin election algorithm cannot be used in asynchronous model since
the adversary can prevent a fraction of the honest parties from being heard, and then prevent them
to be part of the election. We present a similar algorithm to [KSSV06b] that solves this issue in
asynchronous model with private channels. The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 7. Suppose there are n parties, for any fix positive  constant fraction b < 1/4 −  of
which are corrupted. There is a polylogarithmic (in n) bounded degree network and a protocol such
that:
1. With high probability, a 1−O(1/ lnn) fraction of the honest parties agree on the same value
(bit or string).
2. Every honest party sends and processes only a polylogarithmic (in n) number of bits.
3. The number of rounds required is polylogarithmic in n.
The important novelty of our method compare to King et al. [KSSV06b] is that instead of bin
election algorithm, we use CMPC to decide on the parties who move on to the next level. The simple
version of our election method is presented as Simple-Elect-Subcommittee in Protocol 15 that has
the properties described in Lemma 14. The complete protocol and its proof of correctness are given
in Section 7.5
1King et al. [KSSV06b] relax the requirement that all honest parties reach agreement at the end of the protocol,
instead requiring that a 1 − o(1) fraction of honest parties reach agreement. They refer to this relaxation as
almost-everywhere agreement.
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Protocol 15 Simple-Elect-Subcommittee
Goal. Ω(ln8 n) parties agree on a subcommittee of size Ω(ln3 n). The protocol is performed by
parties P1, ..., Pk ∈W with k = Ω(ln8 n).
1. Party Pi generate a vector of c ln
3 n random numbers chosen uniformly and independently at
random from 1 to k where each random number maps to one party.
2. Run CMPC to compute the component-wise sum modulo k of all the vectors. Arbitrarily,
add enough additional numbers from 1 to k to the sum vector to ensure it has c ln3 n unique
numbers.
3. Let WB be the set of winning parties which are those associated with the components of the
sum vector.
4. Return WB as the elected subcommittee.
Lemma 14. Let W be a committee of Ω(ln8 n) parties, where the fraction, fW , of honest parties
is greater than 3/4. Then, there exists some constant c, such that with high probability, the
Elect-Subcommittee protocol elects a subset WB of W such that |WB| = c ln3 n and the fraction
of honest parties in WB is greater than (1 − 1/ lnn)fW . The Elect-Subcommittee protocol uses a
polylogarithmic number of bits and polylogarithmic number of rounds in a fully connected network.
Proof. The proof follows from a straightforward application of union and Chernoff bounds. Let X
be the number of honest parties in WB. By the correctness of the CMPC algorithm, each party in
WB is randomly chosen from W . Let Yi be an indicator random variable, that equals to 1 if the
i-th member of WB is honest. Then, E[Yi] = fW and E[X] = fW c1 ln
3 n. Using Chernoff bounds,
we have Pr[X < (1− 1/ lnn)fW c1 ln3 n] = Pr[X < (1− 1/ lnn)E[X]] ≤ e−
E[X]/ ln2 n
2 < 1/nc. Since
fW > 1/2, setting c1 = 4c, establishes the first part of Lemma 14.
We establish a polylogarithmic bound on the number of bits used in Elect-Subcommittee protocol
since the bit cost of Elect-Subcommittee is polynomial in the number of parties participating in the
algorithm.
7.1 The Election Graph
Our algorithms make use of an election graph to determine which parties will participate in which
elections. This graph was described in [KSSV06a, KSSV06b] and is repeated here.
Before describing the election graph, we first present a result similar to that used in [CL95]. Let
X be a set of parties. For a collection F of subsets of X, a parameter δ, and a subset X ′ of X, let
F(X ′, δ) be the sub-collection of all F ′ ∈ F for which
|F ′⋂X ′|
|F ′| >
|X ′|
|X| + δ.
In other words, F(X ′, δ) is the set of all subsets of F whose overlap with X ′ is larger than the
“expected” size by more than a δ fraction. Let Γ(r) denote the neighbors of node r in a graph.
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Lemma 15. Let l, r, n be positive integers such that l and r are all no more than n and r/l ≥ ln1−zn.
Then, there is a bipartite graph G(L,R) such that |L| = l and |R| = r and
1. Each node in R has degree lnz n.
2. Each node in L has degree O((r/l) lnz n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L′ of L,
|F(L′, 1/ lnn)| < max(l, r)/ lnz−2 n.
The proof of Lemma 15 follows from a counting argument using the probabilistic method and is
omitted. The following corollaries follows immediately by repeated application of the above lemma.
Corollary 2. Let `∗ be the smallest integer such that n/ ln`
∗
n ≤ ln10 n. There is a family of bipartite
graphs G(Li, Ri), i = 0, 1, . . . , `
∗, and constants c1 and c2 such that |Li| = n/ lni n, |Ri| = n/ lni+1 n,
and
1. Each node in Ri has degree ln
c1 n.
2. Each node in Li has degree O(ln
c2 n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L′i of Li,
|F(L′i, 1/ lnn)| < |Ri|/ ln6 n.
4. Let F ′ be the collection of sets Γ(l) for each l ∈ L. Then, for any subset R′i of Ri,
|F ′(R′i, 1/ lnn)| < |Li|/ ln6 n.
Corollary 3. Let `∗ be the smallest integer such that n/ ln`
∗
n ≤ ln10 n. There is a family of
bipartite graphs G(Li, Ri), i = 0, 1, . . . , `
∗, such that |Li| = n/ lni n, |Ri| = n/ lni+1 n, and
1. Each node in Ri has degree ln
5 n.
2. Each node in Li has degree O(ln
4 n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L′i of Li,
|F(L′i, 1/ lnn)| < |Li|/ ln3 n.
Lemma 15 and its corollaries show there exists a family of bipartite graphs with strong expansion
properties which allow the formation of subsets of parties where all but a small fraction contain a
majority that are honest.
We are now ready to describe the election graph. Throughout, we refer to nodes of the election
graph as e-nodes to distinguish them from nodes of the static network. Let `∗ be the minimum integer
` such that n/ ln` n ≤ ln10 n; note that `∗ = O(lnn/ ln lnn). The topmost layer `∗ has a single
e-node which is adjacent to every e-node in layer `∗ − 1. For the remaining layers ` = 0, 1, ..., `∗ − 1,
there are n/ ln`+1 n e-nodes. There is an edge between the ith e-node, A, in layer ` and the jth
e-node, B, in layer `+ 1 if and only if there is an edge between the ith node in L`+1 and the jth
node in R`+1 from Corollary 3. In such a case, we say that B is the parent of A, and A is the child
of B. Note that e-nodes have many parents.
Each e-node will contain a set of parties known as a committee. All e-nodes, except for the one
on the top layer and those in layer 0, will contain c ln3 n parties. Initially, we assign the n parties to
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e-nodes on layer 0 using the bipartite graph G(L0, R0) described in Corollary 3. The i
th party is a
member of the committee contained in the jth e-node of layer 0 if and only if there is an edge in G
between the ith node of L0 and the j
th node of R0. Note every e-node on layer 0 has ln
5 n parties in
it.
The e-nodes on higher layers have committees assigned to them during the course of the protocol.
Let A be an e-node on layer ` > 0, let B1, . . . , Bs be the children of A on layer `− 1, and suppose
that we have already assigned committees to e-nodes on layers lower than `. If ` < `∗, we assign a
committee to A by running Elect-Subcommittee on the parties assigned to B1, . . . , Bs, and assigning
the winning subcommittee to A. (Note that we can run each of these elections in parallel.) If A is
at layer `∗, the parties in A, B1, . . . , Bs, run byzantine agreement for Byzantine agreement.
7.2 Static Network with Polylog-Bounded Degree
We now repeat the description of the bounded degree static network [KSSV06b] and show how it can
be used to hold elections specified by the election graph. For each e-node A, we form a collection of
parties which we call it s-node: s(A). Intuitively, the s-node s(A) serves as a central communication
point for an election occurring at e-node A. Our goal is to bound the fraction of s-nodes controlled
by the adversary by a decreasing function in n, namely 1/ ln10 n, for each layer. As the number
of s-nodes grows much smaller with each layer, we need to make each s-node more robust. To do
this, the number of parties contained in the s-node increases with the layer. Specifically, the s-nodes
for layer i are sets of lni+12 n parties. We determine these s-nodes using the bipartite graph from
Lemma 15, where L is a collection of n nodes, one for each party, R is the set of s-nodes for layer i
and the degree of each node in R is set to lni+12 n. The neighbors of each node in R constitute a
set of parties in an s-node on layer i.
We use the term link to denote a direct connection in the static network. The communications
for an election A will all be routed through s(A): a message from a party x to s(A) on layer i will
pass from the party to a layer 0 s-node, whose parties will forward the message to a layer 1 s-node
and so on, the goal being to reliably transmit the message via increasingly larger s-nodes up to s(A).
Similarly, communications to an individual party x from s(A) will be transmitted down to a layer
0 s-node whose parties will transmit the message to x. We describe the connections in the static
network.
Connections in the static network. Consider the following:
• Let A be an e-node on layer 0 in the election graph. Every party in A has a link to every party
in s(A).
• Let A and B be e-nodes in the election graph at levels i and i− 1 respectively such that A is a
parent of B. Thus, s(A) has lni+12 n parties in it and s(B) has lni+11 n parties in it. Let G be
a bipartite graph as in Lemma 15 where L is the set of parties in s(A), R is the set of parties
in s(B) and the degree of R is set to lnc1 n and the degree of L is set to O(lnc2 n). If there is
an edge between two nodes in L and R respectively, then the corresponding party in s(A) has
a link to the corresponding party in s(B). We will sometimes say that s(A) is adjacent to s(B)
in the static network.
The following lemma follows easily from the application of Lemma 15 and its corollaries. Item
(1) follows from Lemma 3.1; items (2) and (4) from Corollary 3.2; and item (3) from Corollary 3.1.
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Although item (2) only makes a guarantee about layer 0 e-nodes, we will see eventually that with
high probability, the fraction of corrupted e-nodes on every layer is small.
Lemma 16. With high probability, the election graph and the static network have the following
properties:
1. (Bad s-nodes) Any s-node whose fraction of corrupt parties exceeds b+ 1/ lnn will be called
bad. Else, we will call the s-node good. No more than a 1/ ln10 n fraction of s-nodes on any
given layer are bad.
2. (Bad e-nodes) Any e-node whose fraction of corrupt parties exceeds b+ 1/ lnn will be called
bad. Else we call the e-node good. No more than a 1/ ln2 n fraction of e-nodes on layer 0 are
bad.
3. (Bad s-node to s-node connection) For any pair of e-nodes A and B joined in the election
graph, the parties in s-nodes s(A) and s(B) are linked such that the following holds. For any
subset WA of parties in s(A), at most a 1/ ln
6 n fraction of parties in s(B) have more than a
|WA|/|s(A)|+ 1/ lnn fraction of their links to s(A) with parties in WA.
4. (Bad e-node to e-node connection) Let |I| represent the total number of e-nodes on layer i in
the election graph. For any set W of e-nodes on any layer i, at most a 1/ ln2 n fraction of
e-nodes on layer i+ 1 have more than |W |/|I|+ 1/ lnn fraction of their neighbors in W .
The degree of the static network is polylogarithmic.
7.3 Communication Protocols
A permissible path is a path of the form P = x, s(A0), s(A1), ..., .s(Ai) where x is a party in A0, i is
the current layer of elections being held, each Aj is an e-node on layer j, and there is an edge in the
election graph between Aj and Aj+1 for j = 0, ..., i. Each party y in an s-node s(A) on each layer j
keeps a List of permissible paths that determine which parties’ messages it will forward. The List
(for y ∈ s(A)) represents y’s view of which parties are elected (to the subcommittee) at A that are
still participating in elections on higher layers. If y’s List indicates that x is such a party, then the
List will also have the entire path for x, which stretches from x to the elections on layer i in which
x is currently participating in. We have the following definitions.
• We say a s-node knows a message [resp., knows a permissible path, or resp., knows a List
of permissible paths] if 1− b− 2/ lnn parties in the s-node are honest and receive the same
message [resp., have the same path on their Lists, or resp., all have the same List.]
• A permissible path P is good if every s-node on the path knows P . Else the path is bad.
We will show our construction of the static network ensures at most a 1/ lnn fraction of the
permissible paths are bad.
We now describe three primitive communication subroutines: Sendhop, Send, and MessagePass.
The subroutine Sendhop describes how s-nodes (with direct links) communicate with each other,
Send describes how a party communicates with an s-node, and MessagePass describes how two
parties communicate with each other.
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Sendhop(s, r,m, P ). A message m can be passed from s (the sender) to r (the receiver) from a
level i to a level i− 1 or from a level i to a level i+ 1, where s and r are s-nodes on these layers or
one of s, r is a 0-layer s-node and the other is a party. If a party x sends a message to a layer 0
s-node s(A) it sends the message to every party in s(A) (note by construction it will have a direct
link with every party in s(A)). Similarly if a message is sent from a layer 0 s-node s(A) to a party
x, every party in s(A) sends the message to x.
When an s-node s(A) sends a message to s-node s(B), every party in s(A) sends the message to
those parties of s(B) to which it has a direct link. When each party in s(B) receives such a set of
messages, it waits until it receives the same messages from the majority to determine the message.
If there is no majority value, the party ignores the message. Along with sending the message the
parties also send information which specifies along which path P the message is being sent. Each
time a message is received by a party of an s-node s(B) on layer j ≤ i, it checks that:
1. The message came from the s-node previous to it in the path P ; if not the message is dropped.
2. The path P (or its reverse) is on its List of permissible paths. If not, the message is dropped.
3. Only messages that conform to the protocol in size and number are forwarded up and down
the permissible paths. If more or longer messages are received from a party, messages from
that party are dropped.
Send(s, r,m, P ). Of the first two parameters, one must be a party (“x”) and one must be an s-node
(“s(A)”). The path P contains the first parameter s as its start and the second parameter r as
its endpoint. Send(s, r,m, P ) sends the message m from s to r along the path P via repeated
application of Sendhop.
MessagePass(x ∈ A, y ∈ B,m,Px, Py). Both A and B are adjacent e-nodes. Hence, s(A) and s(B)
are adjacent in the static network. A message from party x in e-node A sends message m to
party y in e-node B by first calling Send(x, s(A),m, Px). Then, s(A) sends m to s(B) by calling
Sendhop(s(A), s(B),m, P ), where P is the path consisting of two s-nodes s(A), s(B). Finally, the
message is transmitted from s(B) to y by calling Send(s(B), y,m, P ry ), where P
r
y is the reversal of
path Py.
7.4 SRS-Agreement Protocol
Before describing the SRS-Agreement protocol, we first adapt the Elect-Subcommittee protocol for
the static network. Let A be an e-node with children B1, . . . , Bs, and let X be the set of all parties
from B1, . . . , Bs. For each i ∈ [s] and x ∈ Bi, let Px denote a good path of s-nodes from x to s(Bi)
concatenated with s(A). At the start of the election for A, we assume that each node in Px knows
Px and s(A) knows {Px | x ∈ X}.
We now describe the implementation of the Elect-Subcommittee algorithm. Every party x ∈ X
generate a vector of random numbers chosen uniformly and independently at random where each
random number maps to one party. The parties use the CMPC protocol to determine the winners
(recall that the number of parties in e-nodes is always polylogarithmic, so this can be done sending
only polylogarithmic messages). The list of winners is sent up to s(A), where each party in s(A)
takes a majority to determine the winners. Then, s(A) sends down the list of winners along all the
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permissible paths to each party x ∈ X. Parties on the path (i.e., in s-nodes along the path) update
their Lists of permissible paths to remove those party-paths who lost as well as those party-pairs
who won too many elections (we will quantify this shortly), and make ln4 n copies of each of the
winners’ paths and concatenate a different layer i+ 1 s-node parent onto each one. We present a
detailed description of Elect-Subcommittee in the following.
Protocol 16 Elect-Subcommittee
Goal. Adapted version of Simple-Elect-Subcommittee for static networks.
1. For each x ∈ X: // This stage done in parallel
2. Party x randomly selects one of k/(c1 ln
3 n) random numbers chosen uniformly and inde-
pendently at random from zero to k where each random number maps to one party.
3. Parties in X run CMPC to compute the component-wise sum modulo k of all the vector.
Arbitrarily, add enough additional numbers to the vector to ensure it has c ln3 n unique
numbers.
4. Let M be the set of winning parties, which are those associated with some component of the
vector sum.
5. Each y ∈ X sends M to s(A) by calling Send(y, s(A),M, Py).
6. Parties in s(A) determine M by waiting until they receive the majority of same messages.
These become the elected parties.
7. For each party x ∈ X that is elected, the parties in s(A) use Send(s(A), x,m, P rx ) to tell x,
along with each s-node in Px, that x was elected.
8. Each party in each s-node revises its list of permissible paths to:
Retain only the winners. Eliminate parties who have won more than 8 elections. Make ln4 n
copies of remaining permissive paths, concatenating each with a different s-node neighbor
on layer i+ 1.
9. s(A) sends its list to every adjacent s-node s(B) on layer i+1 using Sendhop(s(A), s(B),m, P ),
where P is the path consisting only of s(A), s(B).
The condition in Step 5 that requires parties who have won more than 8 elections to be eliminated
is a technical condition that insures the protocol is load-balanced and parties in an s-node do not
communicate more than a polylogarithmic number of bits. We now describe the SRS-Agreement
protocol.
Since every party is a member of s(A∗), steps 5 and 6 will insure the final result of the protocol
is communicated to every party.
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Protocol 17 Scalable-SRS-Agreement
Goal. Parties agree on a semi-random string.
1. For l = 1 to l∗:
2. For each e-node A in layer l, let B1, ..., Bs be the children of A in layer l − 1 of the election
graph, and
3. If l < l∗, run Elect-Subcommittee on the parties in nodes B1, ..., Bs. Assign winning parties
to node A.
4. Else parties in nodes B1, ..., Bs solve semi-random-string agreement problem.
5. Let A∗ be the e-node on layer l∗, every party x assigned to A∗ communicates the result of
Step 4 to s(A∗) using Send(x, s(A∗),m, Px).
6. Every party in s(A∗) waits for the majority of same message to determine the result of Step 4.
7.5 Proof of Build-Quorums
To establish the correctness of the protocol presented in Section 7.4, we first state some claims
regarding the primitive communication protocols. Their proofs follow by straightforward probabilistic
arguments and are omitted in the interest of space. Recall the fraction of corrupted parties is b,
where b < 1/4−  for any fix positive .
Claim 1. Let s(A) and s(B) be s-nodes on consecutive layers. Assume the following conditions
hold:
1. Both s(A) and s(B) are good.
2. s(A) is on a permissible path known by s(B).
3. There exists a set W of parties from s(A) such that for every message m, all parties in W are
honest and agree on a message m. Further W consists of at least a 1− b− 2/ lnn fraction of
the parties in s(A).
Then, there is a set W ′ of parties from s(B) such that for every message m, every party in W ′
is honest and agrees on the message m after Sendhop(s(A), s(B),m, P ) is called. (Here, P is the
path s(A), s(B).) Further, W ′ consists of all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the honest parties in s(B).
Proof. Every party in W is honest and sends the same massage to its connected parties in s(B).
The parties in s(B) can afford to wait for the majority of same messages, since s(A) is good and W
consists of at least 1− b−2/ lnn fraction of parties which is more than 1/2 and for majority we need
to receive a fraction of 1/2 same messages from the parties in s(A). Thus, all honest party but a
1/ ln6 n fraction of parties in s(B) will eventually receive the message based on corollary 2.
Claim 2. Let x be an honest party. Assume Px is a good path. Then, after Send(x, s(A),m, Px) is
executed, there is a fixed set W of honest parties which contains all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the
honest parties in s(A) and every party z ∈W agrees on m.
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An election at e-node A is legitimate if the following two conditions hold simultaneously for more
than a 3/4 fraction of parties x participating in the election at A: (1) party x is honest; (2) The
path Px is good.
Lemma 17. For a legitimate election at node A, let X be a set of honest parties with good permissible
paths. (Note |X| > 3 ln8 n/4.) Let W be the set of honest parties in s(A) that know X. Then, after
the execution of Elect-subcommittee, the parties in W know the winners of the election in A, as
do the s-nodes that belong to good paths Px.
Proof. From Claim 7.5, we have that every message m sent by MessagePass(y ∈ Bi, z ∈ Bj ,m, Py, Pz)
from y ∈ X to z ∈ X is received by some fixed set W of honest parties in s(Bi), such that W
contains at least 1− b− 2/ lnn fraction of the parties in s(Bi). By Claim 7.5, every message sent by
y is received by z. Since X contains more than 3/4 of the total parties participating in the election,
(after running CMPC) all the parties in X will all agree on the same set of for random parties. Thus,
after the parties in X send these values to s(A), s(A) will know the winners. When s(A) sends
these winners to X, by repeated application of Claim 7.5, we have every x ∈ X and every s-node in
Px will know these winners.
We have shown that in a legitimate election at node A, s(A) knows the list of winners. We next
consider when paths are dropped from the permissible path Lists.
7.5.1 Permissible Paths Removal
Let y be a party in some s-node on layer i. A permissible path Px is removed from a party y’s List
on layer i if y receives a message from an s-node above it in Px, indicating either x has won more
than 8 elections or x lost in the election held at the last node of Px. Here, we consider when Px
is removed for the former reason, i.e., we give an upper bound on the fraction of parties that are
reported to have won too many elections on layer i.
First we consider the effect of legitimate elections. The following lemma, a version of which
appears in [KSSV06a, KSSV06b], shows that on a given layer a very small fraction of honest parties
win more than 8 times in legitimate elections.
Lemma 18. With high probability, the parties that win more than 8 elections, counting multiplicities,
account for no more than a 16/ ln3 n fraction of the honest parties that are winners of legitimate
elections.
Next, we bound the effect of elections that are not legitimate. We first consider the case where
s(A) is good, yet the fraction of honest parties participating in A with good paths is less than 3/4.
For the remainder of the proof we shall treat such an e-node A as a bad e-node.
Claim 3. Suppose less than a 1/7 fraction of the honest parties of a good s(A) agree on a message m.
Then, after Sendhop(p(A), p(B),m, P ) is executed, all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the honest parties
in s(B) will ignore m.
Proof. Even if the corrupted parties agree on m, since b < 1/4, the total fraction of parties in s(A)
sending the message m is less than 11/28. Thus, at most a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the parties in s(B)
will receive m from a majority of parties in s(A).
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Hence, a good s(A) can only communicate with seven different sets of winners to the s-nodes
below it. Since each honest party will send ln3 n winners, the total number of winners sent is at
most 7 ln3 n. Therefore, a bad e-node can cause at most 7 ln3 n parties to have their permissible
paths removed.
Next, we consider the effect of a bad s-node. We will assume one bad s-node s(A) on layer i
can cause the removal of all the permissible paths for every party participating in the election at A.
Since ln8 n parties participate in an election, and fewer than a 1/ ln10 n fraction of the s-nodes are
bad on a layer, the fraction of honest winners affected is less than 1/ ln2 n. Thus, we can bound
the fraction of the honest winners on any layer i that have their permissible paths removed by
1/ ln2 n+ 1/ ln3 n+ 7βi; where βi represents the fraction of bad e-nodes on layer i. Thus, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Assume the fraction of bad e-nodes on layer i is bounded by c/ ln2 n, for some constant
c. Then, the fraction of honest winners that have their permissible paths removed on layer i is
bounded by 8c/ ln2 n.
7.5.2 Proof of Theorems 7
We now complete the proof of Theorem 7 which follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 20. On layer i, with high probability, at least a 1− 4/ ln2 n fraction of s-nodes s(Aj) have
the following properties:
1. s(Aj) is good.
2. At least a 1− b− 4i/ lnn fraction of the parties in node Aj are honest and have good paths to
s(Aj) (note this implies s(Aj) knows this path). That is, Aj is a good e-node.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. On all layers and particularly layer 0, only a 1/ ln10 n
fraction of the s-nodes are bad. If s(A) is good, then every party in A has a good path to s(A).
Further by construction all but a 1/ ln2 n fraction of the e-nodes on layer 0 consist of at least a
1− b− 1/ lnn fraction of honest parties. So the lemma is true on layer 0.
Assume the lemma is true for layer i. Then, a 1− 4/ ln2 n fraction of e-nodes are good, more
specifically these e-nodes have at least a 1− b− 4i/ lnn fraction of honest parties that have a good
path to their corresponding s-node. Since the election is legitimate by Lemmas 14 and 17, with
high probability, after Elect-Subcommittee at least a 1− b− 4i/ lnn− 1/ lnn fraction of the parties
elected are honest and have a good path to any good parent of their s-node. Thus, at least a
1− b− (4i+ 1)/ lnn fraction of the parties elected at layer i are honest and have good paths to good
parent s-nodes on layer i + 1. By Lemma 19 this fraction is reduced by at most 32/ ln2 n. Thus,
at least a 1− b− (4i+ 2)/ lnn fraction of the parties elected at layer i are honest and have good
paths to good parent s-nodes on layer i+ 1. Since the fraction of bad s-nodes on layer i+ 1 is at
most 1/ ln10 n, by Corollary 3 at least a 1− 1/ ln2 n− 1/ ln10 n fraction of the e-nodes (and their
corresponding s-nodes) are good on layer i+ 1, and have at least a 1− b− (4i+ 2)/ lnn− 1/ lnn
fraction of honest parties that have good paths to their corresponding s-nodes.
By Lemma 20, with high probability the layer `∗ e-node is good. Thus, the parties in this e-node
succeed in solving the semi-random-string agreement problem (Step 4 of algorithm SRS-Agreement).
Since all the parties are in the s-node (though they may appear multiple times) corresponding to A
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on `∗, by Claim 7.5 all but a O(1/ lnn) fraction of the honest parties learn the final result. To prove
the number of bits sent by each party is polylogarithmic we note each party is in a polylogarithmic
number of e-nodes and s-nodes on each layer i, and participates in at most a polylogarithmic
number of election on layer i. Since the number of layers is O(lnn) Theorem 7 follows. Finally, the
correctness of Theorem 6 follows from Theorem 7 and the correctness of SRS-to-Quorum protocol.
8 Conclusion
We described a Monte Carlo algorithm to perform asynchronous MPC in an scalable manner. Our
protocols are scalable in the sense that they require each party to send O˜(m/n +
√
n) messages
and perform O˜(m/n+
√
n) computations. They tolerate a static adversary that controls up to a
1/8−  fraction of the parties, for  any positive constant. We showed that our protocol is secure in
the universal composability framework. We also described efficient algorithms for two important
building blocks of our protocol: threshold counting and quorum building. These algorithms can be
used separately in other distributed protocols.
The following problems remain open. Can we prove lower bounds for the communication and
computation costs for Monte Carlo MPC? Can we implement and adapt our algorithm to make it
practical for a MPC problem such as the beet auction problem described in [BCD+09]. Finally, can
we prove upper and lower bounds for resource costs to solve MPC in the case where the adversary
is adaptive, able to take over parties at any point during the algorithm?
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